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Key points
1. Unresolved conflicts continue to smoulder in
Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Ka-
rabakh and South Ossetia. ÒPara-statesÓ have
formed in most conflict-affected areas. These ha-
ve grown to become permanent players in the
region. In Chechnya, guerrilla fights continue in
the wake of the Russian armyÕs siege of the repu-
blic. The conflict in Tajikistan ended in 1997 and
the normalisation process is currently under
way.
2. Each of these conflicts has entailed profound
political, social, ethnic and economic changes, as
well as affecting other spheres of life. Presently,
it is impossible to return to the pre-conflict situ-
ation. The Òpara-statesÓ have fortified their inde-
pendence and are no longer controlled by the
external powers on which they depended in the
initial phases of the conflicts.
3. Unresolved conflicts, including those of Trans-
nistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh,
South Ossetia and, until recently, Tajikistan, ha-
ve an adverse effect on the situation in the re-
gion. They hinder political and economic deve-
lopment of the affected countries, lead to the
brutalisation of political life and breed instabili-
ty by providing save havens for organised crime,
terrorism, etc. They are also the cause of large-
scale migration problems. However, with time,
these negative effects become less and less tur-
bulent.
4. So far, attempts at solving most of the con-
flicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno- Ka r a-
bakh, South Ossetia) have failed to produce re-
sults other than cease-fires. Permanent settle-
ment could not be achieved, neither through the
use of force nor by way of negotiation. The po-
wer and independence of the Òpara-statesÓ,
hard-line leaderships on both sides, and finally,
military weakness of the metropolises consoli-
date the state of suspension. The conflict in Taji-
kistan was settled using political methods, and
the normalisation process is progressing in a sa-
tisfactory manner. Chechnya has been conqu-
ered militarily by Russian troops and Moscow is
now implementing its model of imposed Ònor-
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malisationÓ, but it does not have full control
over the republic and cannot contain the gro-
wing problems induced by the conflict, such as
the emergence of Chechen terrorism.
5. Some of the negative consequences of the con-
flicts are gradually being abated by the evolu-
tion in RussiaÕs policy towards them (Russia is
gradually ceasing playing on the conflicts as fo-
reign policy instruments and is shifting towards
political and economic measures). Also instru-
mental to this are the increasing involvement of
the US and, to a smaller extent, the EU, in regio-
nal security (as part of their struggle against ter-
rorism), as well as the growing strength of state
systems and the development of political and
economic co-operation between the conflict-
-affected republics (for example, the construc-
tion of the BakuÐTbilisiÐCeyhan pipeline, the
T RAC E C A programme). In the longer term, these
tendencies may also help in resolving the actual
conflicts themselves.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The break-up of the USSR in the late 1980s and
early 1990s was accompanied by a series of eth-
nically and ideologically motivated local armed
conflicts. These stemmed from consequential hi-
storical facts (including, in particular, the
USSRÕs nationality policy) and from gradual poli-
tical, social and economic disintegration. Mo-
scow took part in creation of these conflicts and
played on them as instruments in the struggle
for influence and control outside the Russian Fe-
deration. 
Among the numerous conflicts of that time, tho-
se in Chechnya, Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagor-
no-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Tajikistan re-
ached the largest dimensions and have had the
most profound affect on changes to the original
situation. With the exception of the Tajik con-
flict, the clashes remain unresolved. These con-
flicts have been presented in this paper.
Each of the conflicts in question has its own uni-
que characteristics rendering it different from
the others, and there are quite significant diffe-
rences between the present situations in indivi-
dual conflict regions. However, despite these dif-
ferences, there is a striking similarity between
the origins and development of the conflicts
(from the hot phase to stabilisation and norma-
lisation processes), the positions they occupy in
regional politics, as well as their short- and long-
term consequences on the affected areas and
their surroundings. This study examines these
conflicts from the point of view of these simila-
rities. It includes monographs on the clashes in
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
-Karabakh and Tajikistan.
1. Conflict development and
e v o l u t i o n
1.1. Hot phase of the conflicts
The period of debates, disputes, declarations of
independence and sovere i g n t y, and sporadic fi-
ghting that started with pere s t roika, ended with
the official dissolution of the USSR in December
1991. In early 1992, large-scale war operations
commenced in nearly all of the conflict areas in
question. Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan at-
tempted to establish full control over their re-
spective territories, while separatists in those re-
publics and the opposition in Tajikistan saw the
conflicts as an opportunity for radical bre a k t h ro-
ughs to their benefit. Independent Russia, on the
other hand, perceived the conflicts as an oppor-
tunity to re s t o re the influence it had lost with the
b reak-up of the USSR. In the first, hot phase of
the conflicts, it was Russia who played a key ro l e
and shaped their future by actually supporting
the forces that opposed the independence-o r i e n-
ted elites of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and
Chechnya and the Tajik nomenklatura clans.
Ru s s i a Õ s assistance in terms of arming the parties
(in the Karabakh conflict, weapons provided via
Armenia played a particularly important ro l e ) ,
sporadic direct involvement (e.g. of the air forc e
in Abkhazia or the Russian army acting as a p e-
acemaking force in Transnistria while in fact sup-
porting the separatists; or, finally, the involve-
ment in Tajikistan as part of the CIS peace opera-
tion) or friendly ÒneutralityÓ (e.g. letting volunte-
ers from the Northern Caucasus fight in Abkha-
zia), enabled those powers supported by Ru s s i a
to defeat their opponents (the Tajik opposition)
or to conclude cease-fires under Ru s s i a Õ s a u s p i c e s
in the phase of war that suited them best. 
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By 1994, war operations in Karabakh, Transni-
stria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had ended
with cease-fires enforced under RussiaÕs supervi-
sion in compliance with agreements concluded
under the auspices of the OSCE and the UN (Ab-
khazia). Armed Tajik opposition was expelled to
Afghanistan, and sporadic hostilities continued
far from the countryÕs main centres. Moldova,
Georgia and Azerbaijan emerged from the wars
defeated and humiliated, and coerced to recogni-
se RussiaÕs actual domination (the first presi-
dents of both these countries, who pursued
overly independent policies, were removed from
office by coups dÕetat during that period).
The conflict in Chechnya developed according to
a different scenario. There, the Russian army
was directly involved (this involvement followed
a period of the secret servicesÕ behind-the-sce-
nes operations) and it suffered a defeat in its
struggle with the separatists. The bilateral agre-
ements signed in Khasav-Yurt in 1996 afforded
Chechnya true independence without regulating
formal issues. 
1.2. ÒStabilisationÓ of conflicts
The years directly following the cease-fires were
a period of solidification of the new order. In
Transnistria, Abkhazia, Ossetia and Karabakh,
state structures created even before fundamen-
tal hostilities broke out were gaining strength.
The Òpara-statesÓ displayed all the features of
statehood, such as executive, legislative and ju-
dicial structures, armies, borders, or even their
own postage stamps, yet without international
recognition. Nevertheless, the Òpara-statesÓ ha-
ve implemented foreign policies (as partners
with the OSCE and UN Ð peace negotiation inter-
mediaries), they maintain Òrepresentative agen-
ciesÓ abroad and co-operate with other unreco-
gnised Òpara-statesÓ (including Serbian mini-sta-
tes in Croatia and Bosnia or the ChechensÕ con-
tacts with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan). At
this time the elites governing the Òpara-statesÓ
grew in strength: they took control over and de-
veloped those sectors of the economy (and black
market) that provided income, while simultane-
ously removing political (and business) oppo-
nents and giving their states the character of
ÒfarmsÓ under authoritarian rule.
Strong armies and informal political and econo-
mic assistance provided by Russia (to Transni-
stria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Armenia
(to Karabakh), as well as support from diasporas
(particularly in the case of Armenians, Chechens
and Abkhazians) enable the Òpara-statesÓ to
function in a relatively normal manner with no
threats from the weakened former metropolises,
and may even argue with them assuming posi-
tions of power (this refers to Karabakh in parti-
cular). With time, the Òpara-statesÓ are beco-
ming increasingly independent also of Russia,
gradually constituting a problem for the latter
(for example, Transnistria is too independent to
continue serving as a convenient tool in the pro-
cess of subjugating Moldova and, with time, it
has become increasingly problematic by hinde-
ring the realisation of the commitment to down-
size forces in the conflict region assumed by Rus-
sia at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul). 
An extreme example of the Òpara-statesÓ beco-
ming independent from their patrons was the
coup dÕetat organised by Karabakh forces in Ar-
menia in 1998. It involved the removal from offi-
ce of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was
willing to make certain concessions to Azerba-
ijan, and taking over the ruling of Armenia by
the Karabakh ruling team (the Karabakhisation
of Armenia).
However, this characterisation does not apply to
conflicts in Tajikistan and Chechnya. The Tajik
conflict was terminated within several months
(late 1996 and early 1997) with peace agre-
ements that legalised the opposition, granted it
access to offices and influence, gave it true con-
trol over parent provinces and incorporated its
armed forces, along with their commanders, in-
to state structures. The reason why the situation
developed in this direction was the success of
the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan,
which appalled the Russians, the Uzbeks playing
an active role in manipulating the conflict in Ta-
jikistan, and the patrons of the Tajik opposition,
i.e. Iran and the Afghan mujaheddin of Ahmed
Shah Massud. TajikistanÕs example of showed
just how quickly conflicts may be settled if such
settlement lies within the interests of Russia.
During the inter-war period (1996Ð1999), Chech-
nya was unable to form an integrated state, nor
could it prevent struggles between individual
groups of interests, clans and radical Islamic gro-
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ups. In 1999, it experienced another Russian in-
tervention. The formal reason for this invasion
was the criminal and fundamentalist thre a t
Chechnya posed to its neighbours (the immedia-
te reason being Shamil BasaevÕs raid on Dage-
stan). But the true reason for this invasion was
the fact that Russia needed success to oversha-
dow the disgrace of the armyÕs 1995 defeat and
to promote President Boris YeltsinÕs successor,
Vladimir Putin. Unlike the previous war, this one
ended catastrophically for Chechnya, though ho-
stilities continue today, on a limited scale. 
1.3. Towards normalisation
No significant breakthroughs occurred in the
conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Karabakh at the beginning of the first deca-
de of the 21st century. There has been little pro-
gress in the strenuous peace processes under the
auspices of the OSCE and the UN. ÒPara-stateÓ
elites want the existing order preserved, and au-
thorities of Georgia and Azerbaijan cannot af-
ford to make any concessions because of the so-
cietyÕs resistance. The exchange of fire is only
sporadic (in Karabakh and Abkhazia), and mili-
tant voices are heard somewhat more frequently
from Tbilisi and Baku. Simultaneously, Transni-
stria, Abkhazia and Ossetia, all supported by
Russia, are seeking ways to normalise their eco-
nomic relations with the former metropolises
(open borders, activate trade links, etc.). This pro-
cess is proceeding with considerable difficulty.
In Tajikistan, the peace process continues witho-
ut any serious crises. There have been no major
clashes between the opposition and the govern-
ment (other than the dismantling of gangs stem-
ming from the opposition) since the conclusion
of peace agreements. The country is witnessing
acts of violence less and less frequently. The
compromise on the division of influence and me-
thods of governance (reinforced by the elections)
is basically respected and serves to stabilise the
c o u n t ry. The USÕ anti-terrorist operation in
Afghanistan and the weakening of the negative
influence from the South have contributed signi-
ficantly to this stabilisation.
Having pacified Chechnya, Russia is imposing its
ÒnormalisationÓ plan on the republic, which exc-
ludes militants. Its success depends on Rus-
siaÕs intentions and realistic capabilities (e.g.
funding allotted for reconstruction work). 
It should be noted that, presently, the West is
playing an increasingly important role in the
conflicts alongside Russia and the metropolises.
The EU is involved in Transnistria, while the US
has commitments in the remaining areas. Both
powers are interested in stabilisation, but the
EU wants to achieve it through political and eco-
nomic means while the US is resorting to politi-
cal and military methods. It is becoming ever
more apparent that Russia no longer needs the-
se conflicts and the costs it is bearing in connec-
tion with them are too high.
2. Conflicts Ð new quality 
vs. the external world
The conflicts have been continuing for over ten
years now, and they have become a permanent
element in the political landscape of the regions,
influencing the internal situations of neighbo-
uring countries and the policies of regional po-
wers.
Simultaneously, changes induced by them (inclu-
ding, in particular, demographic changes) are
profound and irreversible. 
2.1. ÒPa r a - s t a t e s Ó
Year after year, the Òpara-statesÓ (Transnistria,
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and, to a smaller
extent, South Ossetia) are becoming more deeply
separated from their mother republics in terms
of politics and economy, as well as the practices
of ordinary citizens. It should be emphasised on-
ce again that, for negotiators, they are partners
standing on equal footing with the recognised
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In a situation
where a forceful solution of the conflicts by the
metropolises seems out of question, Òpara-sta-
tesÓ have good grounds to demand a considera-
ble deal of independence should they return to
the metropolises, and to accept only formal sub-
ordination to the respective centres. A decade of
independence has made the return to pre-con-
flict status impossible. 
The existence of Òpara-statesÓ has an enormous
state- and nation-forming character. The separa-
tion and formation of increasingly strong na-
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tions of Abkhazian, Ossetian, Transnistrian and
Karabakh-Armenian (Karabakh actually being
united with Armenia) with a sense of statehood,
is an apparent fact. 
2.2. Profound structural changes 
in the conflict regions
Conflicts have destroyed the original ethnic
structures of the affected areas. In the most
obvious sense, this refers to ethnic cleansing
and refugee migrations: the flight of Armenians
to Armenia (and Karabakh), mass fleeing of Che-
chens to the neighbouring Ingushetia, especially
during the second war; the migration of Azeris
to Azerbaijan and Georgians to Georgia. In the
latter two cases, refugees presently constitute
more than just a humanitarian problem, but
a political problem as well, having a strong refu-
gee lobby with a permanent parliamentary re-
presentation. Other consequences of the con-
flicts include the restoration of ethnic homogeny
in some regions of Tajikistan and the outflow of
Russians and other non-local nations from the
Caucasus and Central Asia (including the emi-
gration of nearly all of TajikistanÕs intelligentsia).
In the long term, even more important is the
physical destruction of the biological tissue of
nations and the erosion of their social structu-
res. Chechnya is the extreme example with an
estimated loss of life in both wars reaching ap-
prox. 200 thousand people (ChechnyaÕs pre-war
population amounted to approx. 760 thousand).
On top of this there are migrations induced indi-
rectly by the conflicts, a catastrophic economic
and social situation, and the negative asses-
sment of the future. 
These migrations mostly include movements of
Armenians from Armenia and Karabakh (re-
aching one million, according to unofficial data),
migrations of Chechens (both to the Russian Fe-
deration and the West), the migration of Tajiks
(chiefly seasonal migration reaching 700 tho-
usand a year), as well as migrations of Azeris,
Abkhazians, Transnistrians, Ossetians and Geor-
gians. All these people are leaving their coun-
tries and heading mainly to Russia and, possibly,
further into Europe. It is characteristic that mi-
grants usually intend to settle in their destina-
tion countries and bring their families there.
They are very often linked with compatriots in-
volved in criminal activities. It is difficult to mo-
nitor this problem because migrants, and espe-
cially Abkhazians, Transnistrians and Ossetians,
assume Russian citizenship on a mass scale (in
late 2002 and early 2003 Russia intensified ef-
forts to stop this practice) while Armenians from
Karabakh use Armenian documents. 
The changes caused by these migration proces-
ses appear to be irreversible, except for the mi-
gration, to camps in Ingushetia, of Chechens
who do intend to return to Chechnya once the
republic becomes stable again and are today are
forced to go back by Russian authorities. 
2.3. ÒBlack holesÓ
Conflict-affected areas have offered perfect con-
ditions for the development of all types of illegal
activities. Exempt from external supervision and
free from the pressure of the international com-
munity, they have attracted restless individuals
from the entire former USSR region and have be-
come safe havens for all types of extra-legal eco-
nomic and political activity, thus leading to the
formation of a type of Òblack holeÓ phenome-
non. For example, Transnistria has been a per-
fectly organised reloading centre for illegal trade
in cigarettes, alcohol and weapons, etc. For
years, South Ossetia offered a convenient passa-
ge for spirits and other contraband smuggled to
Russia from the South. Tajikistan has been a so-
urce of and, above all, a transit country for hero-
ine and hashish, mainly from Afghanistan. Final-
ly, in Chechnya, the drugs and weapons trade
developed alongside a large-scale ransom kid-
napping business for which the Chechens share
responsibility with representatives of Russian
power structures and administration. 
Each of these illegal businesses has affected the
neighbouring countries and, indire c t l y, We s t e r n
E u rope (as a destination for drugs and illegal im-
migrants). It is symptomatic that these types of
activities would not have been possible without
the knowledge and, fre q u e n t l y, co-operation of
Russian power stru c t u res and financial communi-
ties (this refers in particular to human trafficking
in Chechnya and the drugs trade in Ta j i k i s t a n ) .
A much more spectacular Ð and current Ð  conse-
quence of the conflict regions acting as Òblack
holesÓ is that they have offered shelter and sup-
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port to the armed opposition from neighbouring
countries, including fundamentalist and terro-
rist organisations and individual volunteers
from the whole Empire. Tajikistan served as this
kind of base for the Islamic Movement of Uzbe-
kistan (IMU), which twice destabilised Central
Asia through its attacks on Kyrgyzstan and Uz-
bekistan in 1999 and 2000. The IMUÕs activities
were at least tolerated by (and convenient for)
the authorities in Dushanbe and commanders of
the 201st Mechanised Division stationed in Taji-
kistan. Another such base was Chechnya, which,
like Tajikistan, maintained close working con-
tacts with the Taliban in Afghanistan and the al
Qaida. It was from Chechnya that Shamil Basaev
launched his raid to assist Abkhazia, later attac-
ked Budionovsk and, finally, invaded Dagestan.
Similar bases and strongholds were established
in the Georgian Pankisi Gorge and the ÒWahhabi
republicÓ in DagestanÕ s Buinaksk region. An
extreme example of the scale of threat posed by
the existence of the Òblack holesÓ was the siege
of the theatre in Moscow Dubrovka by the squad
of Movsar Baraev who came from Chechnya and
probably used his contacts in MoscowÕs Chechen
diaspora. 
This shows how problems stemming from the
conflicts are transmitted and develop far from
the areas in which they originated, gradually be-
coming separate and autonomous. 
The effects of the existence of Òblack holesÓ may
be mitigated to a considerable extent, as demon-
strated by the USÕ defeat of the IMU in Afghani-
stan or the liquidation of Chechen bases in the
Pankisi Gorge by the Americans and Georgians.
2.4. Effects on former metropolises
The existence of unresolved conflicts within or
just outside the borders of a country inevitably
affects that country. In addition to the previo-
usly mentioned ÒsecondaryÓ problems of refuge-
es, security issues, stimulation of social patholo-
gies that spread to state institutions (the extre-
me example being the pathologies affecting the
Russian army, other power structures and insti-
tutions Òdealing withÓ the distribution of funds
for the reconstruction of Chechnya), conflicts af-
fect the overall functioning of a country. For Geo-
rgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova, the solu-
tion of the conflicts is of strategic importance
both to their internal and foreign policies. Most
of the resources and efforts expended by politi-
cal elites in all of the conflict-affected countries
over the last decade were to serve this purpose.
Ill success or failure sustained in dealing with
the conflicts frequently led to coups. In the ear-
ly 1990s, coups dÕetat took place in Georgia and
Azerbaijan, in the aftermath of failures in the
war against separatists. Fears that Armenian
president Ter-Petrosyan might make deep con-
cessions to Azerbaijan were the reason for his re-
moval from office by the Karabakh clan in 1998,
following which all key offices in the country, in-
cluding that of the president, were taken by the
military and politicians from Karabakh (the ÒKa-
rabakhisation of ArmeniaÓ). The skilful use of
a conflict on the internal scene could also beco-
me a foundation for major political success, as
demonstrated by the rapid career of Vladimir
Putin. 
Unresolved conflicts also have an effect on the
economies and development prospects of affec-
ted countries. A special example of this is the
break-up of the existing transport connections
network (the blockade of Abkhazia by Georgia
broke one of three existing rail connections be-
tween Russia and the South Caucasus, and the
role of the other was marginalised by the con-
flict in Chechnya). 
Continuing conflicts deter foreign investments.
In the Caucasus, they hindered for years the con-
struction of the BakuÐTbilisiÐCeyhan pipeline
and the BakuÐTbilisiÐErzurum gas pipeline. The
implementation of these investments formally
began only in autumn of 2002.
It is difficult to underestimate the social, econo-
mic and political costs of the authoritiesÕ focus
on conflict settlement.
2.5. Regional policy
Conflicts have become a permanent element of
the political landscape not only for directly affec-
ted countries (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ar-
menia, Tajikistan) and Russia which consistently
plays on the conflicts and aspires to hegemony
in the former USSR region. Neighbouring coun-
tries are also involved in the conflicts, more or
less indirectly, and try to use them for the pursu-
it of their own interests. Some have directly in-
tervened in the development of the conflicts, for
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example Uzbekistan and Afghanistan played
a role in the war in Tajikistan. Others have been
involved indire c t l y, though significantly. Fo r
example, Turkey maintains the blockade of Ar-
menia till present day and holds the Armenians
in check in case of an attack on Nakhichevan.
Iran has been the ArmeniansÕ only window to
the world for years, and it was a patron of the
Tajik opposition. Finally, Romania extended mo-
ral support to Moldova, especially in the begin-
ning. Support from the diasporas has also been
of significant importance for particular conflicts
(the Armenian diasporas played the greatest ro-
le by providing financing and lobbing for its cau-
se in the US and France, among other audiences).
Equally important was the support of certain
ideological communities, especially the radical
Muslims who offered support to Chechnya and
Tajikistan. 
Conflicts appear to be the most important area
of activity for international organisations, espe-
cially the OSCE and, to a smaller extent, the UN.
They also serve as a pretext for the formation
and development of new organisations, such as
the Collective Security Agreement that Georgia
and Azerbaijan were forced to join in 1993, on
the one hand, or, on the other, the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation uniting Russia, China
and the Central Asian republics (except for Turk-
menistan) under the slogan of struggle against
separatism and terrorism. 
The conflicts have also become increasingly im-
portant for the United States, the worldÕs only
superpower since the end of the cold war. For
a decade, Washington intervened in conflicts
continuing in the CIS to a very limited extent.
The US limited itself to verbal calls for regulation
of the conflicts and the reduction of RussiaÕs in-
volvement in them (among other measures, it
struggled to liquidate Russian military bases in
the conflict regions). The US advocated human
rights protection or resorted to imposing limited
sanctions on the conflicting parties. It did so de-
spite AmericaÕs growing political and economic
interests in the region that ranged from support
for the independence of the new republics, to
major investments, mainly in the energy sector,
in the Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. A breakthrough in this policy oc-
curred when George W. BushÕs team took office,
and especially as a result of the shock of the ter-
rorist attacks of 11 September 2001. From that
moment on, the US has shown an increasing de-
termination in its efforts to ensure broadly un-
derstood security for the US and its interests,
even at the expense of the principles of the USÕ
original policy towards Russia. Within a short ti-
me, the Americans undercut the roots of the
conflict in Tajikistan and, indirectly, also of that
in Chechnya, by toppling the Taliban regime, de-
feating the IMU and stabilising the region thro-
ugh their military presence in Central Asia. Al-
most simultaneously, political, economic and mi-
litary measures were taken to strengthen Geor-
gia and liquidate Chechen bases in the Pankisi
Gorge Ð this was achieved in 2002. Tbilisi open-
ly hopes that these measures will be shortly fol-
lowed by the liquidation of Òpara-statesÓ in So-
uth Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
It is worthwhile noting the comprehensive re-
gional approach of the US, evident particularly
in the South Caucasus, where the US is forcing
the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipe-
line. This investment is a priority for Washing-
ton, both in political and economic terms. It en-
forces (trans) regional co-operation involving
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the US, and re-
quires a number of improvements to all Cauca-
sian state sectors. Finally, in order to ensure the
security of the investment, it is necessary to set-
tle the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Karabakh as soon as possible. 
The European Union sees a very similar role for
itself in the stabilisation of the region. The
EUÕs policy towards republics formed following
the break-up of the USSR is undergoing a similar
evolution. Initially, the EUÕs activities in connec-
tion with the conflicts were limited to verbal
calls (e.g. criticising Russia for breaches of hu-
man rights in Chechnya) and measures within
the framework of international organisations
(OSCE). But the EUÕs consolidation process and
its eastward enlargement have made the issue of
an Eastern policy, and security in regions borde-
ring directly with the EU, a top priority. In 2003,
it participated in solving the conflict in Transni-
stria. Also noteworthy are a number of long-
term measures taken by the EU with a view to
support development of the conflict-affected co-
untries and mitigate adverse consequences of
the conflicts. In addition to numerous aid, hu-
manitarian and consulting programmes, organi-
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sed both by the EU directly and international fi-
nance organisations, there is the EUÕs TRACECA
programme in which most of the CIS countries
are taking part, including the conflict-affected
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The aim of
this programme is to build transport infrastruc-
ture and promote adequate legislative solutions
to intensify economic co-operation and trade
exchange along the former Silk Road (i.e. along
the EastÐWest axis). The programme also aims
to stimulate development, openness and stabili-
sation in conflict-affected regions. The TRACECA
project brings real, measurable benefits to parti-
cipating countries and still has considerable de-
velopment potential.
3. Prospects
3.1. Conflict centres
The conflicts have entailed profound changes to
the affected regions in political, social and, indi-
rectly, economic terms. Presently, any attempts
to restore the pre-conflict situation are bound to
fail. 
The Tajik conflict, unlike the others, is basically
over, and the model chosen for its settlement
(a compromise, admission of opposition to pu-
blic life and the division of influence) seems ef-
fective and, furthermore, it appears to streng-
then state structures.
Conflicts in Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Osse-
tia and Nagorno-Karabakh have led to the for-
mation of Òpara-statesÓ that have grown in
strength and become largely independent of
external pressure over the last decade. This is
a factor that will influence the further develop-
ment of the situation.
Chechnya is a special case. Exhausted with wars,
disintegrated, deprived of authorities and le-
aders, with a shattered society, it is not a politi-
cal subject at present. However, this temporary
decline of the conflictÕs political and military im-
portance is accompanied by a steady growth of
security threats (potential Chechen terrorism in
the Russian Federation) and humanitarian chal-
lenges (the problem of Chechen refugees). In the
longer term, Moscow will inevitably be forced to
develop a functional mechanism to administer
and reconstruct the republic. Even in the most
optimistic scenarios, the Chechen issue will con-
tinue to have an adverse affect on the political
situation in the Russian Federation for years.
3.2. Conflict-affected states
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and, first and fore-
most, Russia, have found themselves in quite
a difficult position as regards the conflicts. Given
the importance attached to the Chechen conflict
on the internal scene, and RussiaÕs military do-
mination in the region, Moscow is not prepared
to make any significant concessions to the Che-
chens. Likewise, the negotiating positions of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia and, to a smal-
ler extent, Moldova, are difficult owing to many
years of propaganda calling for the restoration
of full control over the lost territories. Even tho-
ugh the first line of leaders in the individual re-
publics has begun to realise that there is no re-
turning to the pre-war situation, societies refuse
to accept any significant concessions. As regards
Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2003, a compromise is
also out of question because parliamentary elec-
tions in the former, and presidential elections in
the latter, are scheduled for autumn, and there is
g reat concern over ballots. Both these countries,
h o w e v e r, are facing the question of who is to suc-
ceed elderly presidents Shevardnadze and Aliev.
T h e re is a risk that the Russian model of succes-
sion could be implemented Ð namely the pro m o-
tion of a successor through a victorious war.
3.3. Ru s s i a
Russia has co-created the conflicts, sponsored
them and kept them viable. Without Russia, they
would not have reached the present phase of de-
velopment. Simultaneously, for years, Russia tre-
ated these conflicts or, more broadly, destabilisa-
tion, as a convenient instrument of political
pressure on excessively independent republics
and an effective way of handling internal pro-
blems (from the contest of power structures to
PutinÕs election). In this context, RussiaÕs posi-
tion in relation to the conflicts will be immense-
ly important. 
In recent years it has been increasingly clear
that the conflicts have become too costly and
too ineffective an instrument for Russia. They
hinder the efficient reform of state structures
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(especially power structures); induce patholo-
gies in the region and Russia itself (such as orga-
nised crime and terrorism or the uncontrollable
influx of immigrants). Russia has an increasingly
smaller need for them as the focus of its strate-
gy for the regions seen as the Russian zone of in-
fluence shifts towards economic control and in-
fluence. These tendencies are further strengthe-
ned by changes in the USÕ policy entailing Wa-
shingtonÕs increasing readiness to intervene in
security issues in the post-Soviet region and the
importance that Moscow attaches to the prese-
rvation of good strategic relations with the US. 
The observed abandonment by Russia of its
practice of playing on the conflicts is not an un-
controversial process and it gives rise to prote-
sts, especially in the army. The manner in which
Russia wages war and is ÒnormalisingÓ Chech-
nya also shows that its vital interests in regions
constituting part of the Russian Federation are
being enforced unrelentingly.
3.4. The US and the EU
The United States has become an increasingly im-
portant political player in the CIS. It interv e n e s
m o re and more actively in the re g i o nÕ s s e c u r i t y,
acquiring a s t a ke in what used to be Ru s s i a Õ s e xc-
lusive domain until 2001. The bre a k t h rough came
with the anti-terrorist operation in Af g h a n i s t a n
and its side effect Ð the establishment of US mili-
t a ry bases in Uzbekistan and, on slightly differe n t
terms, in Ky rgyzstan and Ta j i k i s t a n .
US presence in Central Asia and in Afghanistan
itself has contributed considerably to the abate-
ment of threats posed by armed Islamic organi-
sations and has indirectly strengthened local re-
gimes by reducing the threat of destabilisation.
Military presence was followed by financial and
expert aid. 
A similar process appears to be taking place in the
South Caucasus, especially in Georgia, where the
US is training and equipping the Georgian army,
supporting state institutions and helping them
c o n t rol the state, and, finally, supporting the con-
s t ruction of the BakuÐTbilisiÐCeyhan pipeline
that will have an extensive stabilising effect on
the region. The US is also preparing legal gro u n d s
for its permanent military presence in Georgia. 
Increased American presence obviously reduces
the threat of a renewed escalation of the con-
flicts. It should be noted, however, that for Tbili-
si, the developing co-operation with Washing-
ton, including support expressed by Georgia for
the US-led operation in Iraq (Georgia and Uzbe-
kistan being the only CIS countries to express
support in this sphere) is a major step towards
the reclaiming of control over the separated pro-
vinces.
Similarly to the US, the European Union is incre-
asingly committed to handling problems caused
by unresolved conflicts in the CIS area. 
It seems that this process will continue as the
EU expands eastwards and develops its Eastern
policy. Already today the EU is increasingly com-
mitted to settling the conflict in Transnistria, an
area constituting a particularly harmful Òblack
holeÓ in close vicinity of the enlarging EU (as Ro-
mania integrates with the EU). 
In Transnistria, Europe has the largest range of
means at its disposal: from political to economic
and military measures (both within the frame-
work of NATO and as individual EU states parti-
cipating in OSCE initiatives). 
It seems likely that the EU will become incre-
asingly committed to the settlement of conflicts
in the South Caucasus as well. Unlike the US tho-
ugh, Europe is resorting mainly to economic, so-
cial and infrastructure measures, thus helping to
gradually abate adverse consequences of the
conflicts rather than actually terminating the
conflicts themselves. 
Krzysztof Strachota
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Map 1. Major armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area
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1. General overv i e w
1.1. Location, area, population
The Transnistrian Republic of Moldova (TRM, Tr a n s-
nistria) occupies the area of the former Moldavian
SSR situated on the left bank of the Dniester River
and comprises the right-bank city of Benderi (Ti g i-
na). The country is a strip of land approx. 200 km
long and ca. 12Ð15 km wide on the average. Its
a rea is 4160 km2 and the capital city is Ti r a s p o l .
Transnistria has a population of 660 thousand.
M o l d o v a n s / Romanians account for 33 percent of
the population, Russians for 29 percent, Ukra-
inians for 29 percent, while 9 per cent of the popu-
lation are re p resentatives of other nationalities.
1.2. Status
Transnistria has not been recognised by the in-
ternational community but is in fact a sovereign
political organism with full control over its terri-
tory and has all the attributes of a state. This se-
paratist republic has a president, a parliament,
an army, a police force and its own currency (the
Transnistrian Ruble). 
1.3. Internal situation
Igor Smirnov has been the TRMÕs president for
over ten years now. The country is ruled by a no-
menklatura or oligarchy of directors of large in-
dustrial establishments who are affiliated with
Smirnov. The TRMÕs economy and trade are do-
minated by the ÒSherifÓ company in which the
key players are Igor SmirnovÕs relatives (Vladi-
mir Smirnov, the TRM leaderÕs son, is ÒSherifÕsÓ
CEO). ÒSherifÓ has connections with the Odessa
and Russian mafias. In Transnistria, semi-legal
and illegal trade thrives, including weapons and
cigarettes trade (nearly all cigarette imports into
Moldova are contraband controlled largely by
Transnistrian companies). Independent media in
the country are suppressed. Elections in the
TRM, although not recognised by the internatio-
nal community, paradoxically enjoy a good opi -
nion of the (few) Western observers.
1.4. Armed conflict
On 2 September 1990, the local nomenklatura
established the Transnistrian Moldovan SSR
with a view to protect its own economic intere-
sts. On 28 August 1991, this republic proclaimed
independence and assumed the name of the
Transnistrian Republic of Moldova (TRM). In
spring 1992, the Moldovan army tried to reclaim
the TRM by force, however, the separatist repu-
blic managed to defend its sovereignty, largely
owing to the assistance of the Russian 14th Army
stationed there.
1.5. The peace process, peacekeeping
forces and Russian troops
Negotiations aiming to settle the conflict politi-
cally have been continuing since 1992. The Rus-
sian Federation acts as mediator and, since 1995,
it has been accompanied by Ukraine in this role.
Except for the OSCE mission established in 1993
and the CIS, no other international organisations
are participating in the process.
The preliminary decision to station CIS peaceke-
eping forces in the conflict region was taken on
6 July 1992 during the CIS summit in Moscow.
Initially, the trilateral (Moldovan-Russian-Trans-
nistrian) forces had the strength of 2.5 thousand
soldiers, but in 1998 this number was reduced to
1.5 thousand. Additionally, the Operational Gro-
up of Russian Forces (the former 14th Soviet Ar-
my and, later, the 14th Russian Army, was trans-
formed into the OGRF in 1997) had been statio-
ned in Transnistria until recently. The OGRF had
withdrawn almost entirely by the end of 2001,
leaving behind its arms and munitions, and
units to guard them but these, too, are to be wi-
thdrawn by the end of 2003.
2. Origins of the conflict
2.1. Transnistria during the first
years of Soviet rule 
Unlike the right bank part of Moldova, Transni-
stria was not part of pre-war Romania. These
areas constituted part of the Moldavian Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republic formed by Soviet
authorities in 1924 as part of the Ukrainian SSR.
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When Romanian Basarabia (Bessarabia) was in-
corporated into the USSR as a result of the Rib-
bentrop-Molotov pact and World War II, the re-
gion of todayÕs Transnistria was included into
the Moldavian SSR. The left bank area was an in-
dustrialised region and the majority of its popu-
lation were Russian-speakers, while the right
bank was predominantly agricultural with a Ro-
manian-speaking majority.
2.2. The perestroika period
In the late 1980s, a nationalistic movement
emerged in Moldova, which advocated the union
of the Moldavian SSR with Romania. The Slavic
population that mainly inhabited the left bank
of the Dniester feared that, in such case, its
members, who did not speak Romanian, would
become second-class citizens. These sentiments
were exploited by the communist nomenklatura,
which enjoyed a strong position on the left bank
of the Dniester. It intended to maintain control
over the industrial establishments located there. 
On 2 September 1990, the Transnistrian Moldo-
van SSR was established. On 28 August 1991, it
proclaimed independence and assumed the na-
me of the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova. 
3. The conflictÕs armed phase
Chisinau refused to accept the secession of the
richest part of the republic. Moldovan authori-
ties decided to reclaim the Transnistrian republic
by force. They presented an ultimatum in which
they demanded the disarmament of Transni-
strian armed forces. When the other party refu-
sed to comply, armed operations began in the
Dubossary and Benderi region on 1 April 1992.
The heaviest fighting took place in May and Ju-
ne. With the assistance of the 14th Russian Ar-
my, Transnistria managed to defend its indepen-
dence, and Moldova was forced to accept a ce-
ase-fire. The cease-fire agreement was signed on
6 July 1992 by the presidents of Russia and Mol-
dova. It came into force on 27 July. Its implemen-
tation was largely enforced by the 14th Army
commander general Alexander Lebed, who at-
tacked MoldovaÕs positions threatening Tiraspol.
4. Current situation in the 
conflict region
4.1. Tr a n s n i s t r i a Õ s social and 
economic situation
Transnistria has a considerable economic poten-
tial which includes the modern steelworks in
Rybnitsa that export steel products to Western
countries, among other destinations. Transni-
striaÕs industry is almost entirely dependent on
energy resource supplies from Russia and, to
a smaller extent, from Ukraine. In recent years,
the Transnistrian economy has been experien-
cing a clear decline. The social situation is bad:
average salaries range from just USD 5 US$ to
USD 20 US$ (according to different sources), tho-
ugh salaries and pensions are paid on a relative-
ly regular basis. Some inhabitants sustain them-
selves with proceeds from contraband, others
have emigrated.
4.2. Peace negotiations. 
The 1992Ð2001 period
Negotiations with a view to settle the conflict
using political means have been continuing sin-
ce 1992. The Russian Federation has been acting
as mediator and, since 1995, so has Ukraine.
Except for the OSCE mission established in 1993
and the CIS, no other international organisations
are participating in negotiations. The cease-fire
is supervised by the Joint Control Commission.
Even before fighting ended, on 21 July 1992, an
agreement was signed on the terms of a peace-
ful solution to the armed conflict.
In 1995 and in 1997 the parties signed two agre-
ements on refraining from the use of force and
economic pressure. In 1996, the presidents of
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine signed a Joint Dec-
laration in which they recognised the sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Moldova.
In November 1999, during the Istanbul OSCE
summit, the Russian Federation agreed to with-
draw its troops from Transnistria by the end of
2001 and to remove its weapons by the end of
2002.
When the Communist Party of Moldova came to
power in Chisinau, following the February 2001
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elections, it appeared that negotiations should
accelerate given the radical improvement in re-
lations between Chisinau and Moscow that had
backed Transnistria until then. However, me-
etings between the new communist president of
Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, and Transnistrian le-
ader, Igor Smirnov, led to no breakthrough, and
the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol de-
teriorated rapidly, leading to a breaking off of
negotiations. This happened despite pressure
exerted on Tiraspol by Moscow, which tried to
persuade the TRM to make certain concessions
to Chisinau. It turned out, however, that after
ten years of existence, the Transnistrian state
was strong enough and could continue functio-
ning even without MoscowÕs support.
4.3. The Òcustoms warÓ between Chi-
sinau and Tiraspol
As negotiations failed, Chisinau resorted to eco-
nomic methods to force the reintegration of
Transnistria. On 1 September 2001, Moldova in-
troduced new customs stamps, but refused to
provide specimens to the Transnistrian side.
This considerably reduced the volume of Trans-
nistriaÕs foreign trade. The blockade was quite
effective, but not absolute.
In response, Tiraspol announced its intention to
transfer controlling blocks of shares in the lar-
gest Transnistrian businesses to Russians. Trans-
nistrian trade union members blocked the Chisi-
nau-Odessa road refusing passage to vehicles be-
aring Moldovan registration plates. From mid-
October 2001, Tiraspol would stop rail cars car-
rying goods to Moldova at the customs border
crossing in Benderi. It also threatened to stop
electricity supplies to Moldova and blockage of
the gas pipeline. 
This Òcustoms warÓ ended with Tr a n s n i s t r i a Õ s suc-
cess, as Chisinau failed to achieve its original go-
al of introducing Moldovan customs officers to
the border between Ukraine and the Tiraspol-
controlled territory, and to force Transnistria to
make concessions on customs issues.
4.4. Developments following the new
OSCE peace initiative 
On 1 and 3 July 2002, in Kyiv, experts from Mol-
dova and Transnistria met for talks concerning
the new OSCE peace plan under the auspices of
mediators OSCE, Russia and Ukraine. The plan
was for Moldova to be transformed into a fede-
ration comprised of two parts: Transnistria and
the ÒproperÓ Moldova. This federation was to
have one president, one government and a two-
house legislative body. Its laws were to bind on
the entire territory. Moldova and Transnistria
would have separate constitutions and symbols.
The official language of the entire state would be
Moldovan written in the Latin script, but indivi-
dual parts of the federation could have their
own official languages. In order to safeguard the
implementation of the agreement, foreign tro-
ops would be stationed in the Moldovan Federa-
tion under the auspices of the OSCE during the
transition period. However, no progress was ma-
de during meetings in the August-September ro-
und of negotiations. While Moldovan authorities
accepted the OSCE document as the basis for
a future agreement, Tiraspol chose to treat it as
a starting point for further negotiations and to
lay down conditions demanding recognition of
TransnistriaÕs sovereignty prior to the formation
of a Moldovan/Transnistrian federation or confe-
deration, and the lifting of the Òeconomic bloc-
kadeÓ by Moldova.
On 10 Fe b ru a ry, Moldovan president Vladimir
Vo ronin announced that it was necessary to for-
mulate a new constitution for the federalised
Moldova and to involve experts from Tr a n s n i-
stria in the task. This, ÒVo ro n i nÕ s initiativeÓ, is
a follow-up to the OSCE plan. The draft details
the main assumptions of the future constitu-
tion, namely the formation of a t w o-tier state
apparatus, the creation of a single customs, de-
fence and monetary space that will include the
e n t i re federation, granting Transnistria the ri-
ght to regulate language issues in its own terri-
t o ry, Moldovan being the state language and
Russian the official language throughout the
Moldovan state. Finally, Transnistria is to be
granted the right to self-determination in the
event of a change in the international legal sta-
tus of the Republic of Moldova. This is a m e a n s
to protect Transnistria in case Moldova is united
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with Romania Ð an eventuality that Tr a n s n i s t r i a
fears. If the constitution is approved in a u n i v e r-
sal vote in early 2005, presidential and parlia-
m e n t a ry elections will be held in the entire co-
u n t ry. The draft was initially approved by Igor
Smirnov on 14 Fe b ru a ry. On 4 April, the Moldo-
van parliament approved the protocol on the
mechanism for the development of the new fe-
deral constitution and, on 9 April, the Supre m e
Council of Transnistria accepted it. On 24 April,
members of the Joint Constitution Commission
w e re introduced to one another at the OSCE
mission in Chisinau. 
4.5. The West and the OSCE vis a v i s
the negotiation process
In 2002, given the slow progress in negotiations
and the upcoming eastward extension of the Eu-
ropean Union and NATO, Moldovan authorities
intensified their efforts to win the support of
Western countries in the negotiation process. 
On 22 November 2002, Vladimir Voronin stated
at the meeting of the NATO Eurasian Partnership
Council that Òhe sincerely hoped efforts within
the framework of NATO would lead to regulation
of the problem [of Transnistria]Ó. 
On 9 April, the Moldovan president took part in
the South-East European Co-operation Process
summit in Belgrade, where he met with Europe-
an Commission President Romano Prodi and NA-
TOÕs Assistant Secretary General for political Af-
fairs, Gunter Altenburg. Prodi promised to
express support for Moldova concerning the es-
tablishment of joint customs posts in the Trans-
nistrian section of the Ukrainian-Moldovan bor-
der. Altenburg said that NATO was ready to get
involved in efforts to settle the Transnistrian
conflict and that it was interested in ending in-
stability in areas that will border the Alliance on-
ce Romania becomes a member. These state-
ments of Western leaders show that both the EU
and NATO will be watching the Transnistrian pe-
ace process with increasing attention.
In early April, OSCE leader Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
called for the formation of peacekeeping forces
with the participation of Western countries. The
stationing of such forces would be provided for
in the future constitution of the Moldovan Fede-
ration. He did not name the specific countries to
constitute the peacekeeping forces, but stated
that the European Union was interested in parti-
cipating in the peace operation.
TransnistriaÕs position on the constitution of pe-
acekeeping forces is radically different. On 6
April, Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov stated
that Transnistria wanted a peace operation or-
ganised under the auspices of Moscow, with the
participation of Russian and, possibly, Ukrainian
troops. He firmly opposed the participation of
Western forces in the contingent. This reveals
a serious dispute, in which Tiraspol is probably
backed by Moscow. At the core of this dispute is
the question of whether the peacekeeping forces
should operate under the auspices of the CIS, as
they have done hitherto and as Russia would ha-
ve it, or under the auspices of the OSCE, as the
West would prefer.
4.6. Tr a n s n i s t r i a Õ s political goals
In the 1990s, TransnistriaÕs fundamental politi-
cal goal was to win international recognition of
its independence. This proved to be impossible
to achieve and, for this reason, Tiraspol reformu-
lated its goal as equal status within a Òjoint sta-
teÓ or confederation formed with the Republic of
Moldova. It seems that, under certain condi-
tions, Tiraspol could accept the formation of
a Moldovan Federation with Transnistria as one
of its two components (it seems unlikely, howe-
ver, that the TRM could accept the status of one
of multiple members of a federation). 
Tiraspol demands economic, political and cultu-
ral sovereignty, the legalisation and the prese-
rvation of its own armed forces (the Dniester Gu-
ard), and maintenance of the Transnistrian Ru-
ble. The right to self-determination for Transni-
stria in the event of MoldovaÕs union with Roma-
nia is a sine qua non condition of all agreements. 
According to Tiraspol, the peacekeeping forces
to guarantee implementation of the future agre-
ement should include a Russian and, possibly,
Ukrainian contingent. Transnistria sees the futu-
re federation as composed of two sovereign sub-
jects.
4.7. MoldovaÕs political goals
MoldovaÕs fundamental goal is to reunite the co-
untry and recover territorial integrity. So far,
Chisinau has been ready to grant Transnistria
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a maximum degree of autonomy within Moldo-
va, but it has refused to recognise the TRMÕs so-
vereignty or grant it a status equal to that of the
ÒproperÓ Moldova. 
The OSCE plan approved by Chisinau, however,
assumes that the two components of the future
federation may be equal. The ruling communists
and the right wing opposition differ considera-
bly on this matter. The former accept the plan,
and a more important role for Moscow in the sa-
feguarding of the future agreement, while the
latter are criticising the OSCE plan and voicing
fears concerning excessive dependence on Rus-
sia, and would even like to exclude Russia from
the peace process as they consider it a party to
the conflict. Moldova supports the participation
of Western states in the safeguarding of the fu-
ture agreement and the presence of Western tro-
ops in the peacekeeping forces. It deems the fu-
ture Moldovan Federation to be a successor to
the present Republic of Moldova that will grant
Transnistria autonomy.
4.8. Involvement of the neighbours
( Russia, Ukraine and Ro m a n i a )
Russia and Ukraine are acting as mediators in
the present conflict in Transnistria and they dec-
lare that they will guarantee future agreement. 
Until recently, Russia had troops of considerable
s t rength stationed in Transnistria. Pre s e n t l y,
they have been downsized to 500 soldiers of the
peacekeeping forces and the divisions in charge
of guarding RussiaÕs military equipment stored
in the separatist republic. Russian companies
hold substantial blocks of shares in Transni-
strian enterprises; for example, the ÒIteraÓ gas
company has shares in the Rybnitsa steelworks.
Transnistria has been striving for some form of
recognition from Russia, in vain. In early 2002, it
made a failed attempt to appoint an ambassador
to the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Both
Russia and Belarus declined this proposal as di-
rected against MoldovaÕs territorial integrity.
Ukraine also recognises MoldovaÕs integrity in
territorial terms, even though radical nationali-
sts from UNA-UNSO would be eager to annex
Transnistria.
Romania has a relatively lower level of involve-
ment in the Transnistrian issue as it fears accusa-
tions of interfering in MoldovaÕs internal affairs.
4.9. The conflictÕs influence on the
situation in the region
The Transnistrian conflict is leading to the de-
stabilisation of the situation in the region and in
Moldova itself. The unclear status of the TRM is
conducive to crime and contraband, including
semi-legal and illegal weapons trade. The con-
flict is breeding problems concerning Moldo-
vaÕs gas debt to the Russian Federation as it is
unclear, which portion of the dues is the debt of
Chisinau and which, of Tiraspol. In addition, the
Transnistrian issue is hindering normalisation of
the situation in Gagauz-Yeri, an autonomous
Turkish-speaking Gagauz minority in the south
of the country. In an attempt to hold central au-
thorities in check, Komrat (GagauziaÕs capital)
maintains close contacts with Tiraspol. Settle-
ment of the conflict in Transnistria would proba-
bly put an end to separatist tendencies in Ga-
gauz-Yeri.
5. Fo r e c a s t s
The negotiations that commenced back in 1992
have failed to produce significant results. 
The slowly but steadily progressing implemen-
tation of the OSCE plan proposed in July 2002,
which projects settlement of the conflict thro-
ugh the federalisation of Moldova, offers some
hope for progress in negotiations. 
The positive sides to the situation include the
fact that TiraspolÕs powerful and consistent resi-
stance to the process of utilisation and withdra-
wal of Russian arms stored on Transnistrian ter-
ritory has been overcome, and Russian military
equipment is now being evacuated. Transnistria
is implementing successive provisions of the
OSCE plan without haste, but consistently. The
specific time limits of the schedule proposed in
VoroninÕs constitutional initiative will help as-
sess the likelihood of success of the new peace
plan on an ongoing basis. 
U n d o u b t e d l y, however, the negotiations will
stumble upon serious problems and there is
a high failure risk involved. Detailed issues, such
as the conclusion of the Òcustoms warÓ or sepa-
ration of the Transnistrian and Moldovan natu-
ral gas debts to the Russian Federation, are espe-
cially difficult. On the other hand, the fact that
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Tiraspol has accepted VoroninÕs initiative and
that successive steps of the plan are being im-
plemented suggests that negotiations may suc-
ceed. It seems that pressure from the West, par -
ticularly from the EU and NATO, is a necessary
condition for success, and so is the co-operative
approach of Russia, which remains an influential
player for Transnistria. The existence of the
Transnistrian Òde facto stateÓ destabilises the si-
tuation in Moldova and the region. Putting an
end to this Òblack holeÓ in South Eastern Europe
is a great challenge for the international com-
munity.
Jacek Wrbel
A B K H A Z I A
Wojciech Grecki
1. General Overv i e w
1.1. Location, area, population
Abkhazia (Abkh. Apsny, Georg. Apchazeti), loca-
ted in North Western Georgia on the Black Sea,
occupies an area of 8.6 thousand km2. Its capital
is Sukhumi. In 1989, Abkhazia had a population
of 525 thousand, with Georgians accounting for
45.7 percent, Abkhazians for 17.8 percent, Arme-
nians for 14.6 percent, Russians for 14.3 percent,
and Greeks for 2.3 percent. In the aftermath of
the 1992Ð1993 Abkhazian-Georgian war, nearly
all Georgians left, as did almost 50 percent of
Russians and half of the Armenians. It is estima-
ted that Abkhazia now has a population of ap-
prox. 300 thousand.
1.2. Status
In the days of the USSR, Abkhazia was an auto-
nomous republic constituting part of the Geor-
gian SSR. Since 30 September 1993, it has been
independent, although no states or internatio-
nal organisations recognise it. Nevertheless, the
separatist regime controls nearly all of the coun-
tryÕs territory except for the upper parts of the
Kodori Gorge1.
1.3. The Abkhazian-Georgian armed
c o n f l i c t
The Abkhazian-Georgian armed conflict, initia-
ted unilaterally by the authorities in Tbilisi in
the summer of 1992, stemmed from the general
crisis of the Georgian state, which followed the
toppling of president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in
winter of 1991Ð1992. It was preceded by ethnic
tension between the Georgian and Abkhazian
communities that had been building up since
1989. With the military assistance of Russia, the
Abkhazians won, repelling Georgians from the
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1 The Georgian Svan tribe that lives there formally recog-
nises the authorities in Tbilisi but is in fact self-governed
and forms a specific Òstate within a state within a stateÓ.
republicÕs territory and rendering Abkhazia in-
dependent from the authorities in Tbilisi.
1.4. Peace negotiations
Following the end of the war, a four-party com-
mission for conflict settlement started work. It
includes representatives of Abkhazia, Georgia,
Russia and the UN. Owing to its efforts, the ce-
ase-fire has been respected until the present day.
Georgians and Abkhazians are carrying on with
peace negotiations, though without much suc-
cess so far. The most important points of the di-
spute include AbkhaziaÕs status and the return
of Georgian refugees. Tbilisi insists that Abkha-
zia let all refugees return to their homes, but Su-
khumi does not want to allow this to happen.
1.5. International peace initiatives
In mid-1993, the United Nations Observer Mis-
sion in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established under
the UN Security CouncilÕs resolution. In April
1994, several units of the Russian Fe d e r a-
tionÕs army were sent to the conflict region in
the capacity of peacekeeping forces. UN and Rus-
sian missions work independently of one other.
2. Origins of the conflict
2.1. The Caucasian war. Abkhazian
emigration and Georgian settlements
In the Caucasian war (1930sÐ1960s), the Abkha-
zians, unlike the Georgians, sided with highlan-
ders. Following the RussiansÕ victory, many of
them had to emigrate, and Georgians settled the
abandoned land. The roots of the present con-
flict, therefore, lie in the 19th century.
2.2. AbkhaziaÕs situation in Soviet 
t i m e s
On 22 February 1921, Soviet rule was establi-
shed in Abkhazia. Initially, Abkhazia was gran-
ted the status of a union republic (like Georgia),
but as soon as December 1921 it was de facto in-
corporated into Georgia as the Abkhazian Auto-
nomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This was follo-
wed by de iure incorporation in 1931.
2.3. Events of 1989Ð1992. 
The legislative dispute between 
Sukhumi and Tbilisi
On 18 March 1989, the National Forum of Abkha-
zia passed an appeal to USSR authorities requ-
esting the restoration of the pre-1931 status 
(i.e. that of a union republic). On 15 July 1989,
riots broke out in Sukhumi, leaving nine Geor-
gians and five Abkhazians dead. In February
1992, the Georgian Military Council repealed the
1978 constitution of Soviet Georgia and restored
the 1921 constitution of the Georgian Democra-
tic Republic. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhazian Su-
preme Council, led by Vladislav Ardzinba and do-
minated by supporters of AbkhaziaÕs sovereign-
ty, repealed the 1979 constitution of the Abkha-
zian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and
passed the restoration of the 1925 constitution
of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic.
2.4. Outbreak of the Abkhazian-G e o r-
gian war 
On 14 August 1992, Georgian troops invaded Ab-
khazia under the pretext of needing to prosecu-
te hiding supporters of the toppled president
Zviad Gamsakhurdia and protecting the railway
line connecting Georgia and Russia. The war that
broke out at the time continued for over a year.
3. The armed phase of the 
c o n f l i c t
3.1. The war 
Following their invasion of Abkhazia, Georg i a n
t roops encountered little resistance and quickly
took over the control of almost the entire re p u-
blic. Abkhazian forces, together with the parlia-
ment and the government, withdrew to Gudau-
ta and defended themselves from there. Heavy
fighting took place in November and December
1992 and March and June 1993, when the Ab-
khazians made repeated attempts at capturing
Sukhumi. In September 1993, Abkhazian forc e s
finally captured Sukhumi and Gali with the
help of Russian weapons, taking over control of
the republic (with the exception of the upper
parts of the Kodori Gorge). In the wake of the
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w a r, nearly all of the Georgian population left
the re p u b l i c .
3.2. Direct causes of the war
The war would probably not have broken out if
not for the behind-the-scenes activities of Mo-
scow that encouraged Abkhazian separatist am-
bitions. When choosing armed confrontation,
Shevardnadze probably expected rapid success
that would improve his credibility in the socie-
tyÕs opinion.
3.3. Ru s s i a Õ s i n v o l v e m e n t
Abkhazia would not have won the war without
the assistance of Russia. Abkhazian forces were
equipped with Russian tanks (T-72, T-80) and
other heavy equipment, and Russia let volunte-
ers and weapon transports across the border.
Abkhazian assaults on Sukhumi in spring of
1993 were accompanied by bombings from Su-
25 aircraft with Russian insignia, which Moscow
dismissed as Georgian provocation.
4. The present situation in the
conflict region
4.1. AbkhaziaÕs status and the 
r e p u b l i c Õ s internal situation
Since September 1993, Abkhazia has been de fac-
to independent. It has a parliament and presi-
dent (Vladislav Ardzinba, elected in December
1994 by the parliament and then, on 4 October
1999, in acommon vote). It also has its own con-
stitution, government, armed forces, courts and
postage stamps. On 12 October 1999, the Abkha-
zian parliament passed the act of state indepen-
dence. However, the republic is not recognised
by the international community. The ÒborderÓ
with Georgia remains closed, while terms of
crossing the Russian border are subject to con-
stant change. The impact of perpetual crisis is
mitigated to some degree by the southern clima-
te that provides an abundance of fruit and vege-
tables. Since the end of 1999, a small degree of
economic growth has been observed. Abkhazia
is ruled in a Òsoftly authoritarianÓ way. Ardzin-
baÕs team is steadily losing popularity, and his
developing illness poses the question of succes-
sion.
4.2. The events of October 2001 
In October 2001, fighting took place in the Kodo-
ri Gorge between Abkhazian forces and a group
of several hundred militants, including Che-
chens from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and
G e o rgians of the ÒWhite LegionÓ and ÒFo rest Bro-
thersÓ guerrilla formations. The Abkhazians ma-
naged to repel aggressors but it remains unclear
who sent the fighters to Kodori. Sukhumi accuses
G e o rgia, while Tbilisi claims it was Moscow. As-
saults by the militants were accompanied by air
bombings of villages situated in Kodori, allegedly
carried out by Russian planes. In the course of
the fighting, a helicopter was shot down with se-
veral members of the UN mission onboard .
4.3. The peace process
The incidents of autumn 2001 stalled the two-
way peace process which had been unfolding
until then with the participation of mediators
and via direct meetings of representatives of the
conflicting parties.
The first round of negotiations took place on 1 and
2 December 1993 in Geneva. The parties assu-
med obligations not to use force, to exchange
prisoners and repatriate refugees. During the 
second round (Geneva, 11Ð13 January 1994), the
parties agreed to establish a demilitarised zone
along the frontline and deploy UN peacekeeping
troops to the area. However, during the third ro-
und (Geneva, 22Ð25 February 1994), differences
emerged that remain unresolved until today. The
first point of contention is AbkhaziaÕs status. Su-
khumi could accept an Abkhazian-Georgian con-
federation at best, but only following proclama-
tion of AbkhaziaÕs independence. The other di-
sputable issue is the return of 200 thousand Geo-
rgian refugees to Abkhazia.
The bilateral meetings have been of merely sym-
bolic importance. The most significant of these
took place in July 1997 when Vladislav Ardzinba
visited Tbilisi. However, no binding decisions
were taken at the time.
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4.4. International peace initiatives
From the beginning, the UN has played an acti-
ve role in efforts to settle the conflict. On 9 July
1993, the UN Security Council decided to send 50
military observers to the conflict area and, on 24
July, it determined to establish the Observer Mis-
sion in Georgia (UNOMIG), which was to super-
vise the cease-fire. The UNOMIG was the first UN
mission in the former Soviet territory. When the
war was over, UNOMIG received a new mandate:
it was to liase with the conflicting parties and
Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia. Subsequ-
ently, this mandate was extended and expanded
upon several times. The UNOMIG now has 190
military observers and 91 civilian observers.
Under the CIS leadersÕ decision taken on 15 April
1994, CIS peacekeeping forces were sent to the
conflict region. In fact, they consisted in Russian
units only. CIS forces were deployed along the
border river of Inguri. Presently, they have 1.5 to
two thousand soldiers. With their mandate
extended every six months, they have managed
to prevent new outbreaks of fighting.
4.5. Involvement of third countries
Russia is the most active intermediary involved
in the regulation of the Abkhazian conflict. Ho-
wever, MoscowÕs policy towards the conflict is
a function of its policy towards Georgia. During
the war, the Kremlin supported the Abkhazians,
thus pressing Tbilisi. Following GeorgiaÕs acces-
sion to the CIS and its consent to the presence of
Russian military bases on its territory, the Krem-
lin forced through a blockade of Abkhazia at the
CIS summit on 19 January 1996. However, whe-
never Georgian-Russian relations become more
frigid, Moscow loosens this blockade. In spring
2002, Moscow started a campaign of issuing
Russian passports to Abkhazians and recently
launched a railway line from Sochi to Sukhumi,
which was met with fierce discontent in Tbilisi.
4.6. The situation after 
11 September 2001
Following the terrorist attacks on the US, the
Kremlin implied that the operation in Chechnya
is part of the struggle against international ter-
rorism. Russia also named Georgia as a country
supporting ÒChechen terrorismÓ.
On 24 May 2002, Russian President Vladimir Pu-
tin and US President George W. Bush issued a jo-
int declaration that included a provision on the
South Caucasus. Both leaders expressed their re-
adiness to co-operate on the regulation of regio-
nal conflicts and confirmed their recognition of
the territorial integrity of all states. Georgia per-
ceived this declaration as an expression of wil-
lingness to help put an end to Abkhazian and So-
uth Ossetian separatism.
5. Fo r e c a s t s
In the upcoming year, the situation in the Ab-
khazian-Georgian conflict may develop along se-
veral scenarios. 
The most probable scenario is that nothing will
change: AbkhaziaÕs status will remain undefined
and peace talks will not proceed from a dead po-
int. Contrary to its verbal declarations, the Kre m-
lin will make efforts to pre s e rve the conflict.
A less likely development is that the parties will
reach agreement and define the status of Abkha-
zia in a way that will satisfy them both. In such
case, RussiaÕs position will also be crucial: it may
decide on the stabilisation of the region in re-
turn for a share in regional transport and com-
munication undertakings and preserving other
instruments of pressure such as gas blackmail
(the Russian Federation is the sole supplier of
gas to Georgia). It is also possible, though, that
the US may come up with a genuine peace initia-
tive for the Abkhazian conflict. In Georgia, hopes
for this are great.
The least probable scenario is that of a new out-
break of war. However, local fights, such as tho-
se of October 2001, may still take place. The im-
portant thing is that Abkhazia sees a growing
opposition against the existing regime. Simulta-
neously, GeorgiaÕs leader is growing old. New te-
ams, both in Sukhumi and in Tbilisi, may prove
to be more open and pragmatic.
Wojciech Grecki
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SOUTH OSSETIA
Wojciech Grecki
1. General overv i e w
1.1. Location, area, population
South Ossetia (Osset. Chussar Iryston, Georg.
Samhret Oseti) lies in northern Georgia, in the
middle part of the Great Caucasus. Its border
runs some 40 km north-west of Tbilisi. The coun-
tryÕs area is 3.9 thousand km2 and its capital is
Ckhinvali. The population of South Ossetia was
approx. 100 thousand in 1990, of which 67.5 per-
cent were Ossetians, 28 percent Georgians, 2.5
percent Russians and 1.5 percent Armenians. 
In the aftermath of the 1990Ð1992 war, a n u m b e r
of Georgians left Ossetia although the exact figu-
re was difficult to estimate. Several thousand
Ossetians left for North Ossetia that forms part
of the Russian Federation.
1.2. Status
Under Soviet rule, South Ossetia had the status
of an autonomous region within the Georgian
SSR. In December 1990, the leader of the Geor-
gian Supreme Council and the future president
of the independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhur-
dia, deprived South Ossetia of its autonomy,
which was one of the causes leading to war. Fol-
lowing the victory of the Ossetians, South Osse-
tia became a de facto independent republic, al-
though it is not recognised by the international
community. Tbilisi maintains that OssetiaÕs land
constitutes part of the (non-autonomous) Òpro-
perÓ Georgia and terms this area Òthe Ckhinvali
districtÓ. Separatist authorities in Ckhinvali con-
trol almost the entire area of the former region,
with the exception of several Georgian enclaves.
1.3. The Ossetian-Georgian armed
c o n f l i c t
The conflict began in autumn 1990 when the
communist authorities of South Ossetia procla-
imed the formation of the South Ossetian Soviet
Democratic Republic (as part of the USSR) and
announced its secession from Georgia. In re-
sponse, authorities in Tbilisi deprived Ossetia of
its autonomy and introduced a state of emergen-
cy in its region. In late 1990 and early 1991, the
first skirmishes took place between units of the
Georgian army and local self-defence squads. In
spring 1991, regular war broke out. Fights car-
ried on with varying intensity for over a year.
The separatists finally won. They were suppor-
ted by volunteers from North Ossetia and unof-
ficially encouraged by Russia. On 25 June 1992 in
Dagomys, the leaders of Georgia and the Russian
Federation Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yelt-
sin signed a cease-fire agreement that has been
respected till today.
1.4. Peace negotiations
The proper negotiation process began in March
1997, but the only results it has produced are
a few agreements of lesser importance. Unlike in
the case of the conflict in Abkhazia, it is not like-
ly that new hostilities could break out in South
Ossetia.
1.5. International peace initiatives
Under the Dagomys agreement, peacekeeping
forces were formed in the conflict region, which
included three ÒnationalÓ battalions: the Geor-
gian, the South Ossetian and the Russian batta-
lion. The status and mandate of these troops ha-
ve remained unchanged since their formation.
On 6 November 1992, the OSCE (then CSCE) esta-
blished a mission in Georgia, whose main task
was to bring the conflicting parties closer. The
mission, who has a staff of twenty and offices in
Tbilisi and Ckhinvali, is still operating.
2. Origins of the conflict
2.1. Ethnic origins of the Ossetians.
The formation of South Ossetia
The Ossetians are an Indo-Iranian nation. They
have always occupied the territory of present
day North Ossetia. In the 13th century, they be-
gan to colonise the land of todayÕs South Ossetia
that belonged to Georgian princes. However,
until the mid-20th century, they remained a mi-
nority. During the years of GeorgiaÕs indepen-
dent existence (1918Ð1921), Ossetians opposed
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the Menshevik government in Tbilisi and sup-
ported the Bolsheviks. In 1921, the Red Army in-
vaded Georgia and incorporated it into the for-
ming Soviet state. In 1922, Moscow established
the South Ossetian Autonomous Region in genu-
inely Georgian land. This became one of the cau-
ses of the future conflict.
2.2. The perestroika period
The idea to unite the two Ossetias emerged in
the second half of the 1980s in Ckhinvali and
Vladikavkaz in the atmosphere of the Caucasian
peoplesÕ national revival. In North Ossetia (part
of the Russian Federation) the National Union
(Adamon Cadish) established in 1989 as an orga-
nisation of the local intelligentsia came up with
the slogan ÒOne nation Ð one republicÓ. In South
Ossetia (Georgia) similar demands were put
forth by the National Council (Adamon Nykhas).
Activists of both these organisations agreed that
the united Ossetia should become part of the
Russian Federation. The Ossetian national move-
ment had been deeply penetrated by Soviet se-
cret services. 
2.3. Events of 1990 
On 20 September 1990, the communist authori-
ties of South Ossetia proclaimed the formation
of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Repu-
blic (part of the USSR) and its secession from
Georgia. Simultaneously, they initiated the offi-
cial procedure to unite with North Ossetia and
join the RFSSR. Authorities in Tbilisi responded
in December 1990 by calling off OssetiaÕs auto-
nomy and introducing a state of emergency in
its territory. In late 1990 and early 1991 the first
encounters between the Georgian army and lo-
cal self-defence squads took place.
3. Armed phase of the conflict
3.1. Fighting
Clashes between Ossetians and Georgians deve-
loped into a war on 6 January 1991 when regu-
lar Georgian troops entered the district, meeting
with the firm resistance of Ossetian self-defence
formations. Fighting continued with varying in-
tensity for more than one year, the heaviest pha-
ses taking place in spring and late autumn of
1991. The Georgians never managed to capture
Ckhinvali, although they have attacked the city
repeatedly. On 14 May 1992, Ossetian and Geor-
gian forces concluded a cease-fire that was bre-
ached eleven days later. North Ossetia, which
blamed Georgia for this, cut off supplies of gas
sent via the pipeline from Russia to Armenia.
The blockade continued for three weeks. On 25
June, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze and
Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed a cease-fi-
re agreement in Dagomys. The cease-fire conti-
nues to be respected till today.
3.2. Direct causes of the conflict
The most significant cause of the conflict was
the clash between Georgian and Ossetian natio-
nalism and the communist and democratic
outlooks. On 28 October 1990, the first democra-
tic parliamentary elections were held in Georgia,
in which the Zviad GamsakhurdiaÕs ÒRound Ta-
ble Ð Free GeorgiaÓ political block was the win-
ner. In South Ossetia, the vote was boycotted.
On 14 November, Gamsakhurdia stepped in the
office of the chair of the Georgian Supreme Co-
uncil. His awkward policy, which included the
rapid Georgianisation of public life expressed in
the slogan ÒGeorgia for the GeorgiansÓ, shook
national minorities, including the Ossetians.
3.3. The roles of North Ossetia and
M o s c o w
Russia lent Ossetians a helping hand. North
Ossetia, which formed a part of the Russian Fe-
deration, provided support that included volun-
teers, weapons and money.
There is a significant amount of evidence indica-
ting that this happened with the consent, or in-
deed by the inspiration of Moscow. Presumably,
it was the Kremlin that provoked the incidents
in South Ossetia by luring Ckhinvali activists
with the vision of uniting the district with Rus-
sia on the one hand, and disseminating anti-
Georgian propaganda on the other. The purpose
behind this provocation was to keep Georgia in
the USSR.
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4. Current situation in the 
conflict region
4.1. The Òpara-stateÓ 
South Ossetia is actually an independent repu-
blic, though its statehood is not recognised by
any country or international organisation. On 29
May 1992, i.e. shortly after the cease-fire was
breached but before the Dagomys agreement
was concluded, authorities in Ckhinvali procla-
imed independence invoking Òthe nationÕs willÓ.
In January, a referendum was held in which ne-
arly 100 percent of voters said ÒyesÓ to either
a union with North Ossetia and joining the Rus-
sian Federation, or independence. The referen-
dum, however, hardly met democratic stan-
dards. All types of elections have been taking
place regularly In Ossetia since then. In the most
recent presidential elections (November and De-
cember 2001), the winner was Eduard Kokoyty
(Kokoev); in 1993Ð2001 the republic was led by
Ludvig Chibirov. The most recent parliamentary
elections took place in 1999. South Ossetia also
has other state structures such as an army, poli-
ce force, customs services, etc. It symbolically li-
ves by Moscow time, which is one hour ahead of
GeorgiaÕs time zone.
4.2. Social and economic structure
Since the war, most of South OssetiaÕs industrial
establishments have been closed down. In the
countryside, a natural economy is dominant.
This difficult situation is mitigated by target
subsidies from the budgets of North Ossetia and
Moscow and from the Russian federal budget.
Unlike the closed Abkhazian-Georgian ÒborderÓ,
the border between South Ossetia and Georgia
has not been controlled since 1996, and the mo-
vement of people and vehicles continues witho-
ut difficulty. Near Ckhinvali, there is a large who-
lesale market in which retailers from all of nor-
thern Georgia buy their goods. The border with
Russia is open to anyone with a registered domi-
cile in South Ossetia. The Ossetians are not requ-
ired to hold visas that were introduced for traf-
fic between the Russian Federation and Georgia
on 5 December 2000.
The most important source of revenue for the
unrecognised republic is contraband: gigantic
quantities of spirits are smuggled from South
Ossetia to Russia. Russian customs services esti-
mate that, in 1996, the value of smuggling re-
ached half a billion USD. In autumn 2002, Geor-
gia was expected to carry out a police and mili-
tary operation as part of its campaign against
organised crime. Though no such operation was
carried out in the end, Ckhinvali perceived the
plan as a concealed attempt at liquidating the
Òpara-stateÓ.
4.3. Relations with North Ossetia and
Ru s s i a
North Ossetia remains South OssetiaÕs ÒpatronÓ.
Representatives of the ÒRussianÓ Ossetia act as
intermediaries in peace negotiations, but they
no longer support the idea of uniting both terri-
tories. This idea, however, is still cherished by le-
aders in South Ossetia and its social organisa-
tions.
The authorities of the Russian Federation also
assist the Òpara-stateÓ. This assistance includes
the previously mentioned subsidies and visa-free
travel owing to which Ossetians can cross the
border easily and earn their livings. For Russia,
South Ossetia remains a convenient instrument
to press Georgia, which is why the Kremlin aims
to preserve the conflict.
4.4. The peace process
For the first four years following the end of the
war, contacts between Tbilisi and Ckhinvali took
place through the mediation of North Ossetian
authorities, the Kremlin and the OSCE. The actu-
al negotiation process began on 5 March 1997
when the authorised representatives for regula-
tion of the conflict appointed by Ckhinvali and
Tbilisi met for the first time. The only outcomes
produced so far by these negotiations are a few
agreements of secondary importance, although
contacts between Tbilisi and Ckhinvali are regu-
lar, even at the leadership level. 
The key point in the dispute is the status of the
former autonomy, while the problem regarding
the return of Georgian refugees is less impor-
tant. It seems that, in spite of its invariably inde-
pendence-oriented rhetoric, Ckhinvali is prepa-
red to accept a special high status as part of Geo-
rgia, but it is delaying the signing of binding
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agreements in order to see how much the Ab-
khazians can ÒbargainÓ in their negotiations
with Tbilisi. RussiaÕs position and the shadowy
interests cited above, linking high representati-
ves of both parties, are also conducive to the pre-
servation of the conflict.
4.5. International peace initiatives
Under the Dagomys agreement, peacekeeping
forces were established in the conflict region.
They include one Georgian battalion, one South
Ossetian battalion and one Russian battalion,
a total of ca. 2,000 soldiers. The task of the pe-
a c e keepers is to prevent renewed hostilities
from breaking out. The ÒJoint Control Commis-
sionÓ comprised of representatives of Georgia,
South Ossetia and Russia was appointed to su-
pervise the cease-fire. Its status and mandate re-
main unchanged.
On 6 November 1992, the OSCE (then CSCE) esta-
blished a mission in Georgia, the main task of
which was to bring the positions of the two par-
ties closer and to co-operate with the Joint Con-
trol Commission. The mission, who has 20 em-
ployees and offices in Tbilisi and Ckhinvali, con-
tinues to operate today.
5. Fo r e c a s t s
Among the post-Soviet conflicts leading to the
formation of Òpara-statesÓ, the conflict in South
Ossetia is the least severe and its parties, the
most willing to make concessions and reach
c o m p romise. Nevertheless, no bre a k t h ro u g h
should be expected in the nearest future. The
existing status quo is in keeping with the intere-
sts of major elite groups both in Ossetia and
Georgia. Russia is also interested in preserving
the conflict. In the longer term of several years,
Ckhinvali might accept some form of dependen-
ce on Georgian central authorities. In such case,
the republic would have to be granted broad au-
tonomy.
Wojciech Grecki
N A G O R N O- K A R A B A K H
Jacek Wrbel
1. General overview 
1.1. Location, area, population 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK, Armenian Arcakh) loca-
ted in West Azerbaijan is an enclave. At its nar-
rowest point, it measures 6 km from the Arme-
nian border and 15 km from Iran. It has an area
of 4.4 thousand km2. As a result of the Armenian-
Azeri war in 1992Ð1994, Karabakhi Armenians
occupied and have, since then, had control over
almost the entire enclave and its surrounding re-
gions2. In 1989, it was inhabited by 76 percent of
Armenians, the rest of the population being Aze-
ris and Russians. In 1991, the population of Ka-
rabakh numbered 193 thousand. Now, as all the
Azeris, almost all the Russians and some Arme-
nians (economic emigration) have moved away,
it is smaller, the number being only slightly hi-
gher than 140 thousand.
1.2. Status
Nagorno-Karabakh is formally part of Azerba-
ijan. In the USSR, its status was that of an auto-
nomous region within the Azerbaijani SSR. Cur-
rently, Nagorno-Karabakh (the former territory
plus occupied Azeri land) is de facto an indepen-
dent state, though unrecognised by any other
state (including Armenia) or international orga-
nisation. It has its own army, police force, presi-
dent and parliament. Fragments of the territory
in the north of the region remain beyond Stepa-
nakertÕs control.
1.3. The Azeri-Armenian military 
conflict 
In 1992Ð1994, regular fights took place between
Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh and
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2 A total of approx. 12 thousand km2, i.e. approx. 14 percent
of the territory of Azerbaijan; there is wilful data manipu-
lation on this issue: Azeri sources overrate the area at 17
thousand km2 and 20 percent of the territory, while Arme-
nian sources exclude Karabakh itself from the occupied ter-
ritories. 
neighbouring areas of Azerbaijan. Armenians
won the war, rendered NK independent from
Azerbaijan and seized the adjacent territories.
Armenia did not participate in the war officially.
On 9Ð12 May 1994, Russian mediation led to the
signing of an armistice. The cease-fire has been
respected until now, with minor cross-border fi-
ghts occurring sporadically.
1.4. Peace negotiations
In March 1992, the CSCE Minsk Group was for-
med, now co- c h a i red by the US, Russia and Fr a n-
ce. Under its auspices, direct negotiation me-
etings of the presidents of Armenia and Azerba-
ijan, Robert Kocharian and Geidar Aliyev, have be-
en held since April 1999. However, negotiations
have failed to yield any measurable pro g ress. 
2. Conflict genesis
2.1. Events at the turn of the
19th/20th centuries
Armenian conflict with the Turkic nations dates
back to the late 19th century, when the develo-
ping nationalist movement in Turkey clashed
with the Armenian pro-independence plot. The
conflict then culminated in Armenian massacres
in the Ottoman Empire in late 19th and early
20th centuries, the largest of which took place in
1915, when approx. 600 thousand Armenians
died (though some sources even cite 1.5 million
victims). 
2.2. 1918Ð1920
During the short-lived independence of the Tr a n s-
caucasian republics in 1918Ð1920, Armenia and
Azerbaijan were involved in a territorial dispute
over Nagorno-Karabakh territory.
2.3. The Soviet period
Following the inclusion of Armenia and Azerba-
ijan in Soviet Russia in 1920, Nagorno-Karabakh,
94 percent of whose population consisted of Ar-
menians, was rendered part of the Azerbaijani
SSR in the form of an autonomous region, which
gave rise to the current conflict. 
2.4. P e r e s t r o i k a and first clashes
On 21 February 1988, the local Council of Pe-
opleÕs Deputies of the NK Autonomous Region
applied to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan, to transfer the re-
gionÕs administrative control to Armenia and, as
the request was denied, it passed the annexa-
tion itself. This brought about the first Arme-
nian-Azeri incident in NK, during which two
Azeris died, and Armenian massacres in Sumga-
it (a town near Baku), which lasted three days
and were totally overlooked by the army and po-
lice forces. On 1 December 1989, the Supreme
Council of Armenia passed a resolution on the
annexation of the NK Autonomous Region to the
Armenian SSR. At the same time, Armenian gu-
errillas started fighting in Karabakh against the
Azeri and Soviet forces.
On 2 August 1991, at a session of all levels of the
NK Autonomous Region, the establishment of
the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was procla-
imed. On the same day, Azeris launched artillery
fire on Stepanakert and, on 26 November 1991,
Baku annulled the regionÕs autonomy.
3. Armed phase of the conflict
3.1. The war
Regular Armenian-Azeri fights began in January
1992 and continued, with luck passing from one
side to the other, though Karabakhi Armenians
held their own much better on the frontline. Fi-
nally, Armenians won the war and occupied part
of ÒproperÓ Azerbaijan (the Lachin region, which
provided a ground connection with Armenia, as
well as the Agdam and Fizuli regions). On the
whole, Armenians occupied approximately 14
percent of AzerbaijanÕs territory.
On 12 May 1994, a cease-fire between Azerba-
ijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (despite
the fact the latter had not formally participated
in the war) was signed in the presence of Rus-
sian and CSCE Minsk Group representatives. 
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3.2. Involvement of third countries
Armenia did not deem itself a party to the con-
flict, although the reality was different (food,
equipment and weapon supplies to Karabakh,
training of volunteers for fighting Azeris). Russia
first took the AzerisÕ side, however, when, in
mid-1992, the pro-independence Abulfaz Elchi-
bey became president of Azerbaijan, it shifted its
support to the Armenians (extensive military
aid). Armenians also received backing from Iran. 
Turkey, in turn, helped Azerbaijan (weapon sup-
plies, military advisers, blockade of its border
with Armenia). Yet it rejected BakuÕs appeals for
an open armed intervention against Armenia. 
4. Current situation in the 
conflict region
4.1. The Òpara-stateÓ
Nagorno-Karabakh is de facto an independent
state, though unrecognised by any other state
(including Armenia) or international organisa-
tion. It has its own armed forces (its army is tho-
ught to be the strongest in the South Caucasus),
police force, president and parliament. Since 
2 September 1997, its president has been Arka-
diy Gukasyan, who replaced Robert Kocharian
(in March 1997, Kocharian became Prime Mini-
ster and, in March 1998, he became the presi-
dent of Armenia). 
ArmeniaÕs currency is the Armenian dram. There
is freedom of movement for people between NK
and Armenia, and the Permanent Representation
of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in Arme-
nia, where foreign citizens receive NK entry vi-
sas, operates in Yerevan. Karabakhi Armenians
wishing to travel abroad can apply for Armenian
passports. There is Karabakh-Iranian bord e r-
crossing point (illegal in terms of the internatio-
nal law) in the town of Minjevan, where Iran for-
mally borders Azerbaijan. Such facilitations and
considerable assistance provided by the Arme-
nian diasporas have been easing the crisis in NK. 
The republic is ruled by a military regime3, addi-
tionally, it is common for Armenian soldiers to
perform their military service in Karabakh. 
4.2. Peace negotiations
On 24 March 1992, during the CSCE summit in
Helsinki, the CSCE Minsk Group (later OSCE),
consisting in eleven member states, was foun-
ded. Its aim was to put an end to the fighting
and then hold a peace conference. On 9Ð12 May,
Russian mediation led to the signing of an armi-
stice in Bishkek. The document was signed by
the defence ministers of Armenia and Azerba-
ijan, as well as by the Òdefence ministerÓ of the
unrecognised government of the Republic of Na-
gorno-Karabakh. 
On 10 August 1995, the OSCE chairman-in-office
appointed his personal representative to settle
the conflict (this was ambassador Andrzej Ka-
sprzyk). At the OSCE summit in Lisbon in 1996
the principle of AzerbaijanÕs territorial integrity
was set as the basis for negotiating the Kara-
bakh issue. Both Armenia and NK protested aga-
inst the decision. Since September 1997, the gro-
up has been chaired by the US, Russia and Fran-
ce. The countries are now represented by Rudolf
Perina, Nikolai Gribkov and Hugues Pernet. 
Since April 1999, direct negotiation meetings ha-
ve been held between the Armenian and Azeri
p residents, Robert Kocharian and Geidar Aliyev,
under the auspices of the Minsk Group. However,
the only tangible success of these is that military
actions are being restrained from resumption and
the very fact that such peace talks exist at all.
There are two main approaches to the issue of
resolving the conflict, the difference between
them being the order of settling the issues under
dispute: the comprehensive variant and the Òstep
by stepÓ variant. The former provides for the si-
multaneous reaching of an agreement on the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the withdrawal
of Karabakhi forces from the occupied territories
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3 Every man who leaves Karabakh and does not return in
over three months without reporting to a competent mili-
tary office is considered a deserter, and criminal charges are
launched against him. 
of Azerbaijan (this variant is pre f e r red by the Ar-
menian side reluctant to lose its means of pre s s u-
re on Azerbaijan, which is the occupation of the
Òsecurity zoneÓ around NK). The latter variant as-
sumes that NK must first withdraw its tro o p s
f rom the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, and
only then may any talks on Ka r a b a k h Õ s status be-
gin. The Azeri side prefers this variant4.
Among the numerous proposals made during
negotiations, the most important two are: Paul
GobleÕs Plan (exchange of territories between Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan) and John MarescoÕs Plan
(an associated state). The first proposal provides
for the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Ar-
menia by handing over the ÒLachin corridorÓ. In
exchange, Armenia would transfer the Meghri
region to Azerbaijan, which would provide the
latter with a ground corridor to the Azeri encla-
ve of Nakhichevan. The associated state plan as-
sumes that Karabakh (within the 1988 borders)
would remain part of Azerbaijan, being simulta-
neously Òloosely associated with AzerbaijanÓ,
and it would be entitled to maintain its repre-
sentatives in Yerevan, Baku, Moscow and other
capitals, though it would not be recognised as
a sovereign, independent state. Azerbaijan wo-
uld have no right to keep any weapons systems
of an offensive nature near Karabakh. Armenia
would receive the right of free transit through
the Lachin corridor to NK, and Azerbaijan would
be entitled to the same via the Meghri region to
Nakhichevan.
Another point worth mentioning includes plans
to grant independence to NK (unacceptable for
the Azeri side) and to grant Karabakh autonomy
within Azerbaijan (which, in turn, Armenians
would not agree to). 
4.3. Positions of the parties to the
c o n f l i c t
Armenia and Nagorno-KarabakhÕs positions are
similar, differing only in details and emphasis on
certain issues. Armenians do not agree to Kara-
bakhÕs autonomy within Azerbaijan and they
support the simultaneous establishment of
NKÕs status and withdrawal of Karabakhi troops
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan only agrees to granting extensive au-
tonomy to Karabakh, ruling out NKÕs sovereign-
ty or annexation to Armenia. Baku demands that
the Karabakhi army first leave the occupied ter-
ritories before discussions about KarabakhÕs sta-
tus can start. 
4.4. Key West summit and negotia-
tion breakdown
On 3Ð6 April 2001 in Key West, Florida, an Arme-
nian-Azeri summit took place. The US Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, participated in talks be-
tween presidents Robert Kocharian and Geidar
Aliyev. These probably involved discussions on
a new peace plan supposedly consisting in the
creation of a joint political organism out of the
Karabakh territories and the Lachin corridor that
would be administered by Armenians, yet under
the patronage of the US, Russia and France. The
remaining land occupied by Armenians would
be returned to Azerbaijan. Apart from that, re-
gional communication routes, including the rail-
way link connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhiche-
van, would be unblocked. The Key West summit
stirred up hopes for a breakthrough in negotia -
tions, yet another summit, which had already
been arranged, did not take place. This could be
due to the criticism by the Armenian opposition
of the concessions promised by president Robert
Kocharian. 
4.5. The situation after 11 September
2 0 0 1
When, following the attacks on the US, both
Azerbaijan and Armenia declared support for the
anti-terrorist coalition, this seemed to be an op-
portunity for intensifying dialogue between
Yerevan and Baku. However, such hopes were so-
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4 Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian was inclined to
agree to the Òstep by stepÓ solution principle, however, he
was opposed by the public opinion of Armenia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora. Due to his standing
for this option, he lost the power in February 1998. This
illustrated the scale of resistance facing Armenian leaders
who are willing to compromise. 
on shattered. Azerbaijan began accusing Karaba-
khi Armenians of participating in the worldwide
terrorist network, and Armenia, in turn, blamed
Azeris for collaboration with Chechen militants.
When they met at the CIS summit in Moscow on
30 November 2001, Aliyev and Kocharian did not
have any real discussion about Nagorno-Kara-
bakh.
In early April 2002, both Yerevan and Baku nomi-
nated special presidential envoys for the Kara-
bakh conflict, which have met on several occa-
sions. This initiative, yet again, has failed to
bring about any real change to the situation. 
4.6. Summits in Sadarak and 
Chisinau. The diminishing role of the
OSCE MG 
Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev met again on 14
August 2002 in Sadarak, Nakhichevan Republic
and, later (for the 22nd time), on 7 October du-
ring the CIS summit in Chisinau.
The usefulness of the Minsk Group in peace ne-
gotiations was brought up for discussion. Both
the Armenian and the Azeri delegations dropped
hints that, in the opinion of their states, the ten-
year-long OSCE mediation had not been effective
enough. 
4.7. Economic consequences of the
continuing conflict 
The lengthy, unresolved conflict affects the re-
gionÕs economic situation; the blockades of the
Armenian-Azeri and Armenian-Turkish borders
hinder commerce. The conflict also increases the
level of investment risk and renders the entire
South Caucasus a less attractive place for invest-
ments. Due to the conflict, regimes are beco-
ming more authoritarian; authorities in Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan and NK are using the external
enemy bogey to ÒdisciplineÓ the opposition. 
4.8. The international and regional
implications of the conflict
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has been
one of the factors consolidating the network of
alliances in the South Caucasus. It has forced
(and still forces) Armenia to tighten its alliance
with Russia and get closer to Iran. As regards
Azerbaijan, it has been cementing (and continu-
es to do this) the countryÕs natural alliance with
Turkey and its close relations with Georgia and
NATO. The existence of the Òpara-stateÓ additio-
nally gives rise to a number of negative occur-
rences, e.g. it contributes to growth of crime in
the region. 
5. Fo r e c a s t s
Negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
have been deadlocked since 2001 (the Key West
summit) and any revival of the peace process do-
es not seem possible at present. Simultaneously,
there is practically no probability of any new
war breaking out under the rules of the current
regimes in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenians
are satisfied with the status quo so they do not
want another war, and the authorities in Baku
fear another defeat. Commencement of the Ba-
kuÐCeyhan oil pipeline construction, a large We-
stern investment in the South Caucasus, also re-
duces the risk of war. Azerbaijan, more intere-
sted in the change of status quo on the Karabakh
issue, simultaneously deeply cares about the
success of the investment. Thus, if military ac-
tions were to resume, any chance for its imple-
mentation would be buried for a long time.
The status quo, fixed in recent years, seems sta-
ble. Paradoxically, a greater danger to the stabi-
lity of the region could ensue if decisive at-
tempts to settle the dispute are made. Both Aliy-
evÕs and KocharianÕs power lacks full public
mandate. Therefore, the argument of war in offi-
cial propaganda facilitates the maintenance of
the social balance. Progress in negotiations se-
ems possible only if authorities in both coun-
tries change. Meanwhile, it seems dubious that
the possible succession of Geidar Aliyev by his
son Ilham, to the throne in Baku, could be consi-
dered such a change.
Jacek Wrbel
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C H E C H N YA
Maciej Fa l k o w s k i
1. General overview 
1.1. Location, area, population
Chechnya is located in the central-eastern part of
the North Caucasus, its area being approx. 16.6
thousand km2 (since the division of the Cheche-
n o-Ingush ASSR in 1992, the border between
Chechnya and Ingushetia has not yet been for-
mally drawn). Chechnya is bord e red from the
west by Ingushetia and North Ossetia, by the Sta-
v ropol Region from the north, Dagestan from the
east, and by Georgia from the south. Ac c o rding to
the last Soviet census of 1989, the population of
the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was 1.27 million, inc-
luding 57.8 percent of Chechens, 12.9 percent of
Ingushes and 23.1 percent of Russians. Fo l l o w i n g
the first Chechen war (1994Ð1996), the estimated
population was 900 thousand (probably overra-
ted), reportedly including 70 percent of Chechens.
The launching of the second Chechen war in au-
tumn of 1999 caused a mass exodus of Chechens
( a p p rox. 350 thousand moved away), mainly to
neighbouring Ingushetia (around 120 thousand
Chechen refugees live there today).
The Russian national census of October 2002
showed that almost 1.1 million people now live
in the republic; however, these data are certain-
ly overstated. Independent experts estimate
that no more than 600 thousand people live in
Chechnya. The capital of Chechnya is Grozny,
with population of up to 100 thousand (397 tho-
usand in 1989). 
1.2. Specifics of the Chechen conflict
The Chechen conflict has been the most long la-
sting (in terms of active military actions) and the
bloodiest within the post-Soviet region. Fights in
Chechnya continue today (this is the second mi-
litary phase of the conflict; the first took place in
1994Ð1996). This armed conflict is the only one
within the territory of the Russian Federation.
Unlike other disputes, the parties to the Che-
chen war do not hold peace negotiations, which
have been doggedly refused by Russia, striving
to suppress Chechen separatism by military me-
ans and attempting to normalise the situation in
the republic according to its own scenario. One
of the key elements of the conflict is the very nu-
merous Chechen diaspora in Russia (approx. 100
thousand Chechens live in Moscow alone),
which cannot be disregarded by authorities be-
cause of its political ambitions and influence;
the situation in the republic is reflected in rela-
tions between Chechens living in Russia, autho-
rities and other people.
1.3. Status of the republic
Chechnya was the only republic of the Russian 
Federation not to sign the federation treaty of 
31 March 1992; despite this fact, the Russian con-
stitution specifies it as one of the Fe d e r a-
t i o nÕ s constituents. In Fe b ru a ry 1992, Duday-
e v Õ s regime, unrecognised by Moscow, adopted its
own constitution, which proclaimed Chechnya an
independent state. Following the first war, under
Ru s s i a n -Chechen agreements signed in Khasavy-
urt (22 July and 31 August 1996), it was arranged
that the issue of the Chechen status would be
postponed for five years. The documents did not
state that Chechnya was part of the Russian Fe d e-
ration. During the inter-war period (1996Ð1999),
the republic was, in reality, independent, though
its independence was not recognised by any sta-
te. As the Russian troops marched into the repu-
blic in October 1999, this actually meant the re-
instatement of Russian jurisdiction over Chech-
nya. On 23 March 2003, as the result of a referen-
dum held in the republic, a new constitution de-
termining Chechnya as an inseparable part of
Russia was adopted (Chechen armed opposition
did not recognise the referendumÕs results). Ad-
ditionally, according to the Kremlin, an agre-
ement on the distribution of powers between
Moscow and Grozny will be signed soon, which,
in the KremlinÕs opinion, will finally resolve the
issue concerning the status of the republic. 
2. Conflict genesis
Contemporary events in Chechnya are deeply ro-
oted in history. The reasons for Chechen enmity
towards Russia and their striving for an inde-
pendent state should be looked for back in Tsa-
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rist Russia, as well as the Soviet times. The co-
nquest of the Caucasus by Russia, which lasted
from the late 1800s to the mid1900s, was bloody
and relentless. It was the Chechens who put up
the fiercest resistance against the TsarÕs army,
and their lands were seized as late as in 1859.
Repressions used against them by Russians fan-
ned one uprising after another, the last of which
broke out in the 1940s.
Since conquering the Caucasus, Russia never ma-
de a single attempt to integrate the region with
the rest of the empire, treating it as an internal
colony and its residents as second-class citizens.
As a consequence, differently to Russians, Che-
chens maintained in their egalitarian society ar-
chaic clan structures and an anarchistic appro-
ach to such notions as state, power or law.
Mutual enmity and strangeness were further de-
epened by Soviet rules, especially by the depor-
tation of Chechens to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan, which was carried out on Joseph Sta-
linÕs orders in February 1944 (they were accused
of collaborating with the Germans). In 1957, the
Chechens were allowed to return from exile, ho-
wever, until the collapse of the USSR; they were
still discriminated against in different ways. The
republic always lagged behind the entire USSR
as concerns economic development, and hidden
unemployment was its chronic problem. In the
early 1990s, following the collapse of the USSR,
the weakening of the central power and the eco-
nomic crisis, the unsettled Russian-Chechen con-
flict burst out again. 
3. The conflict
3.1. ÒThe Chechen revolutionÓ and
Jokhar DudayevÕs rules (1991Ð1994)
Along with GorbachovÕs perestroika, Chechen na-
tional revival began. In 1991, as the result of
a coup, the radical Chechen national movement
seized power and coined pro-independence slo-
gans. Chechnya was announced a sovereign sta-
te, and a former Soviet general, Jokhar Dudayev,
became its president. Chechnya did not sign the
federation treaty of 31 March 1992 and, in fact,
it remained outside the Russian state. Following
its abortive attempt at military intervention
(November 1991), Moscow withdrew its troops
from the republic, and left behind a multitude of
weapons. The dictatorial DudayevÕs rules provo-
ked the emergence of a strong opposition in the
republic. Moscow actively supported it, hoping
to bring down DudayevÕs regime. Yet, all of the
oppositionÕs attempts to overthrow the regime
by force failed.
3.2. The first Chechen war
( 1 9 9 4 Ð 1 9 9 6 )
On 11 December 1994, the Russian army mar-
ched into Chechnya. The official reason for the
intervention was the need to Òrestore constitu-
tional orderÓ in the republic and prevent separa-
tism and instability from spreading to other
North Caucasian republics. The true reason be-
hind it was that most of the Russian body of ge-
nerals needed the war to improve their position
and the prestige of the army in the state, as well
as cover up their illegal deals with the Chechens.
Moreover, Moscow wanted to regain control
over the oil pipeline passing through Chechnya. 
Although the Russian forces occupied Grozny
and a major part of lowland Chechnya within
the first months of the war, they did not mana-
ge to crush the resistance of Chechen guerrillas,
who were backed by most of the republicÕs po-
pulation. The Russian army appeared unprepa-
red for the waging of such wars, it sustained
enormous losses and its reputation, according to
public opinion, continued to worsen. In con-
trast, Chechens fought a successful guerrilla
war, even making several raids outside of the re-
public, to eventually rescue Grozny from the
Russians in August 1996.
The lengthy war gave rise to a conflict of intere-
sts between the Russian armed stru c t u re s ,
which wanted it to continue, and the fuel-and-
energy lobby, which strove for its conclusion.
The key issue, however, was the approaching
presidential election in Russia, during which Bo-
ris Yeltsin was going to seek re-election; brin-
ging the Chechen conflict to an end was inten-
ded to win him votes. Peace talks started follo-
wing the death of Jokhar Dudayev (April 1996).
On 31 August 1996, the Russian-Chechen peace
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agreement was signed in Khasavyurt, which en-
ded the first Chechen war. Russia actually con-
sented to ChechnyaÕs independence, and the is-
sue concerning the status of the republic was
postponed for five years. Soon afterwards all
Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya,
and power passed to the militants. 
The outcome of the war was tragic. Around 60
thousand people died, including approx. five
thousand Russian soldiers and approx. 10 tho-
usand militants, hundreds of thousands fled
Chechnya. The war also brought about profound
changes in the structure of the Chechen society
and the republicÕs national composition. The
most serious consequences of the war included
RussiaÕs diminishing position in the North and
South Caucasus, the weakening of the Krem-
linÕs control over other North Caucasian repu-
blics, and the humiliation of the Russian army.
3.3. ChechnyaÕs Ò q u a s i - i n d e p e n d e n c e Ó
( 1 9 9 6 Ð 1 9 9 9 )
On 27 January 1997, presidential and parliamen-
tary elections were held in Chechnya, and Aslan
Maskhadov, who until then had been Chief of
Staff of the Chechen Army, a moderate politician
standing for the regulation of relations with Mo-
scow as soon as possible, was elected president.
However, Maskhadov failed to create a strong
and well-organised state, and anarchy prevailed
in Chechnya. Along with objective factors (ru-
ined economy, unregulated status), other mat-
ters, such as the ambitions of local leaders, mo-
stly former field commanders who did not want
to submit to the central authority, were respon-
sible for the independence fiasco. The opposition
pursued a destructive policy demanding the re-
signation of the authorities and the transforma-
tion of Chechnya into an Islamic state; crime
rampaged through the country. Although presi-
dent Maskhadov sought peaceful relations with
Russia, he did not receive any support from it to
crack down on the Islamic opposition and bring
order to Chechnya. 
3.4. The second Chechen war (1999Ð)
The pretext for moving the federal army back to
Chechnya was the aggression by Shamil Basayev
and Khatab-led Chechen Islamists against Dage-
stan (August 1999), who announced their inten-
tion to found an Islamic state in the entire North
Caucasus. Apart from that, in September 1999,
a series of bombings took place in Russian cities
( M o s c o w, Buinaksk, Volgodonsk), which killed al-
most 300 people. Allegations of plotting these at-
tacks were brought against Chechens, and fear
psychosis combined with anti-Chechen hysteria
s p read across Russia. It was in such atmosphere
that the new chief of the Russian government ca-
me into power Ð Vladimir Putin who, soon after
taking the office, declared a m e rciless battle aga-
inst terrorism, which yielded him great public
support. The renewed intervention in Chechnya
was called an Òanti-terrorist operationÓ .
The new war in Chechnya facilitated the smooth
transfer of power in the Kremlin: on 31 Decem-
ber 1999, when prime minister Putin was alre-
ady a very popular politician, president Boris
Yeltsin stepped down and handed over the du-
ties of the state head to the prime minister. On
26 March 2000, early presidential elections were
held in Russia, won by Vladimir Putin. Issues of
power succession seem to have played the key
role in the launching of the Chechen war. This
was also desired by the Russian army, which was
humiliated by its defeat in the first war and by
being forced to withdraw from the republic in
1996. 
On 1 October 1999, Russian troops marched into
Chechnya. The federal army, which now opera-
ted with much more success than during the
first war, managed to crush the key Chechen
groups and subjugate most of the Chechen terri-
tory. As the war began, the civil population ru-
shed away from the republic, mainly to neighbo-
uring Ingushetia. In spring 2000, Chechen forces
waged a guerrilla war, which continues today.
The present war is much more brutal than the
previous. In small units, militants avoid open
clashes with Russians, and instead concentrate
on laying mines, firing against Russian columns
and helicopters, and murdering those Chechens
who co-operate with Russians. In retaliation, the
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federal army pacifies Chechen villages, accusing
residents of supporting the guerrillas. 
Mass repressions used by the Russian army, and
increasingly brutal fighting methods that both
parties resort to, aroused radical feelings among
most of the militants in Chechnya. On 23 Octo-
ber 2002, a Chechen commando led by Movsar
Barayev committed a terrorist attack, which had
no precedence so far in the entire history of the
conflict, by occupying the Dubrovka theatre in
Moscow and taking approx. 800 people hostage.
The only demand the terrorists made was conc-
luding the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal
of Russian troops from the republic. This was
both a blow to the security and stability of the
Russian state and evidence of failure of the
KremlinÕs policy towards Chechnya. On 25 Octo-
ber, Russian special units took the theatre buil-
ding by storm, killing all of the terrorists; over
a hundred hostages died. After the Moscow at-
tack, Chechnya, which had been far in the back-
ground of the most important problems of Pu-
tinÕs Russia, once more became a priority issue in
the KremlinÕs policy.
4. Current situation in the 
conflict region
4.1. The KremlinÕs Chechen policy
Already in June 2002, the Kremlin announced
the end of the military phase of the Òanti-terro-
rist operationÓ, handing command over to the
Federal Security Service. A temporary civil admi-
nistration was appointed, led by former Òsepara-
tistÓ mufti of Chechnya Akhmed Kadyrov, who
had shifted to the Russian side as early as in
October 1999. The Chechen government was for-
med in January 2001. In spite of the fact that the
brutal guerrilla war had been going on continu-
ously in the republic, authorities tried to persu-
ade the Russian public and international opinion
that the normalisation process was in progress
in Chechnya. Starting with spring 2002, the
ÒChechenisationÓ policy, i.e. legitimisation of the
pro-Russian Chechen authorities and the gradu-
al passing of power in the republic to them, was
being implemented. However, it was opposed by
the army, who did not want to share the power
with ÒciviliansÓ. Russia was aiming at the unila-
teral establishment of peace in Chechnya and
imposing its own order, without admitting mili-
tants to the peace process (although secret talks
were held with them in an attempt to urge them
to lay down their weapons and support the new
authorities). 
The ÒChechenisationÓ policy was continued with
intensified effort following the Dubrovka tragedy.
Authorities took a number of actions and made
many promises to Chechens, hoping to get closer
to the conflictÕs end. One of the key elements of
Ò C h e c h e n i s a t i o nÓ included the constitutional re f e-
rendum held in the republic on 23 March 2003.
According to official results, 96 percent of votes
were cast in favour of the constitution, and tur-
nout reached over 80 percent. The adoption of
the Chechen constitution was aimed at sealing
the end to Chechen separatism, the inclusion of
the republic under Russian jurisdiction and de-
priving the Ichkerian authorities, elected in
1997, of their legitimacy. The Chechen Ministry
of Internal Affairs was also established by the
end of 2002. The Kremlin promised to hold pre-
sidential and parliamentary elections in the re-
public, the granting of amnesty to militants, the
signing of an agreement on the distribution of
powers between Moscow and Grozny, an incre-
ase in expenditure on the economic reconstruc-
tion of Chechnya, etc. The process of removing
generals from the republic, who were involved
in various illegal deals and kept refusing to co-
operate with the republicÕs civil authorities, also
began. In addition, it was announced that part
of the moderate Chechen opposition would be
allowed to participate in the peace process in
the republic. 
4.2. The role of the federal army
A staunch opponent to change in the repu-
blicÕs current situation is the federal army, who
treat Chechnya as conquered territory. The se-
cond Chechen war has, in the eyes of the Russian
army, been a type of revenge for the humiliation
it suffered after the signing of the agreements in
Khasavyurt in 1996. Following the defeat of the
major Chechen forces in 1999 and 2000, Chech-
nya became a closed military zone and remains
as such. Carrying on the Òanti-terrorist opera-
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tionÓ serves the interests of the military for se-
veral reasons. Owing to it, the armyÕs position
ranks very highly in the state (relations with
other force stru c t u res being particularly impor-
tant), which involves vast financial means and
opportunities for promotion. More o v e r, the
unstable situation in Chechnya and its isolation
f rom the rest of the country enable the military to
trade in illegally mined oil, accept bribes without
any limits, rob civilians and trade in people.
4.3. The separatists
President Aslan Maskhadov, unrecognised by
Moscow, has, since the beginning of the war, ap-
pealed to Moscow on many occasions for nego-
tiations, aware that successful military action
against the Russian army is impossible today,
and that carrying on the conflict in the context
of the international war on terrorism is to the di-
sadvantage of the militants.
The Kremlin, in turn, has ruled out any option of
contact with the Chechen president, branding
him a ÒterroristÓ.
For the time being, everything seems to prove
that Maskhadov has no control over the troops
fighting in the republic and he enjoys hardly any
support from the Chechens. The real leadership
of the resistance movement is in the hands of
the young, whose actions are uncoordinated. 
4.4. The republicÕs present 
a u t h o r i t i e s
For nearly three years now Akhmed Kadyrov has
exercised civil authority in Chechnya and, since
the republicÕs constitution came into force, has
been the acting president of the republic. Kady-
rov, who is hated and regarded as traitor by
most of his fellow citizens, has managed to sub-
ordinate almost all civil authority organs in the
republic and gain a very strong position in rela-
tions with the Kremlin. 
Currently, Kadyrov also has considerable milita-
ry force: he is in charge of 12 thousand Chechen
militiamen and he has an approx. 2,000-strong
Òsecurity guardÓ team, who terrorise the Che-
chen population. Though almost all relevant for-
ces in the republic (the army and other armed
s t ru c t u res, militants, Chechen diaspora, etc.) feel
uncomfortable about the current Chechen chief
of administration, he continues to receive sup-
port from the Kremlin, because Ka d y rov seems to
be the only guarantee for success of the ÒCheche-
n i s a t i o nÓ policy line taken by the authorities. 
4.5. The conflict from the perspecti-
ve of the international opinion
No state or any key international organisation
has questioned MoscowÕs jurisdiction over
Chechnya, however, during the first months of
the second war, the Kremlin heard almost no-
thing but criticism for its actions in the Cauca-
sus; limited sanctions were imposed on Russia.
In view of the lengthy campaign and the need to
normalise relations with Moscow, interest in
Chechnya started to drop on the international
arena and growing indifference towards the
Chechen issue was being displayed. Gradually,
all sanctions on Russia were lifted. Following the
US 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the
K remlin unfolded an expansive pro p a g a n d a
campaign trying to prove that its operations in
Chechnya fit in the fight against global terro-
rism and discredit the Chechen resistance move-
ment. As a result, the support of world opinion
for Chechens dropped to almost zero. The last
yearÕs terrorist attack on the theatre in Moscow
has only added to that tendency. Even though
the West criticises Russia for infringing human
rights in Chechnya and appeals to it to bring the
conflict to a peaceful end, Moscow can generally
do whatever it likes in the republic. 
4.6. The meaning of the war for the
r e g i o n
The second Chechen war has ÒdisciplinedÓ the
other North Caucasian republics and curbed any
separatist tendencies they may have had.
Thanks to the war ÒbogeyÓ, President Putin eli-
minated inconvenient republic leaders, inclu-
ding the long-ruling (1991Ð2001) president of In-
gushetia, Ruslan Aushev, who was replaced by
Federal Security Service General Murat Ziazikov.
Both federal and Ingush authorities are trying to
force out of Ingushetia over 100 thousand Che-
chen refugees, whose presence there contradicts
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the Kre m l i nÕ s claims re g a rding the normalisation
of the situation in Chechnya. The war has also
b rought about further erosion of Caucasian uni-
t y: while, during the first war, Chechens were of-
f e red sympathy and compassion in the re g i o n ,
now they are seen as the main culprits of the
conflict and a f o rceful solution to the Chechen
p roblem is more acceptable. Militarisation of the
e n t i re region has become a key element of the
war; in its eastern part (Chechnya, Ingushetia
and, to some extent, Dagestan) the Russian army
has gained extensive and sustainable influence.
5. Fo r e c a s t
Seemingly, the present moves by the Kremlin are
aimed at ending the conflict in Chechnya, which
is upsetting and sometimes even dangerous (as
proven at Dubrovka), mainly for President Putin.
The war is consuming immense financial means,
ruining RussiaÕs image on the international are-
na, causing the degeneration of certain state
structures (mainly of the army) and, moreover, it
can be used by some political groups to destabi-
lise the country. Many of the KremlinÕs proposals
concerning Chechnya (amnesty, reconstruction
of the republic, involving part of the opposition
in the peace process, etc.) could tangibly contri-
bute to the conclusion of the conflict. What is
more, the second war curtailed the force of Che-
chen separatism, and most of the republicÕs po-
pulation would support any authority that could
ensure them normal life. However, the realisa-
tion of such proposals will certainly be impeded
by many factors (e.g. corruption, obstruction of
the army) that can undermine the entire policy
of ÒChechenisationÓ. One of the conditions for
ending the conflict is surely a change in the be-
haviour of the federal army in the republic: re-
pressions against the civil population give rise
to ChechensÕ disrespect  towards authorities and
cause increasingly more people to join the guer-
rillas. On top of that, Russian forces interested in
preserving the existing situation in the republic
are present (mainly connected with the army),
therefore, in order to end the war, Putin will ha-
ve to either impose his policy on such forces or
take their interests into account in the repu-
blicÕs new situation. 
In the nearest future, the careful and gradual
continuation of the ÒChechenisationÓ policy, an-
nouncing amnesty and assigning additional fi-
nancial means, can be expected. Already this
year administration of the Òanti-terrorist opera-
tionÓ is supposed to be transferred from the Fe-
deral Security Service to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Presidential elections in Chechnya (along
with the elections to the Russian Duma) are
planned for December 2003, and parliamentary
elections (simultaneously with the presidential
elections in Russia) are to be held in March 2004.
When the republicÕs new authorities are establi-
shed, Moscow will be able to sign with them an
agreement on the distribution of powers. The
key question, however, remains whether the
new authorities will include moderate represen-
tatives of militants, which would contribute to
ending the conflict. During the pre-election cam-
paign, which has in fact already commenced in
Chechnya, a fierce fight for the support of the
Kremlin may ensue. The situation in the republic
will then be certainly tense and unstable, and
the actions of militants, the guerrilla war and
terrorist attacks will surely intensify.
Maciej Falkowski
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TA J I K I S TA N
K rzysztof Strachota
1. General overview 
1.1. Location, area, population
The Republic of Tajikistan (Jumkhurii Tojikiston)
has been an independent state since 1991. It is
the smallest country in Central Asia (143.6 tho-
usand km2); most of its territory is covered by
the mountains and foothills of Pamir-Alai and
part of the Fergana Valley. Afghanistan, China,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan border Tajikistan. Ta-
jiks are an Indo-European nation of the Iranian
language group and constitute 65 percent of the
countryÕs population of 6440.7 thousand. Princi-
pal minority groups include Uzbeks (25 percent),
Pamirian nations (approx. 5 percent) and Rus-
sians (approx. 3 percent). The dominant religion
is Sunni Islam (80 percent), while the remaining
religions are Ismaili (5 percent) and other smal-
ler groups. The capital of Tajikistan is Dushanbe
(530 thousand inhabitants). 
1.2. Civil war 
In 1992Ð1997, Tajikistan found itself engaged in
civil war, which Ð depending on the point of
view taken Ð was either ideological (between
the Democratic and Islamic opposition on one si-
de, and the post-communist nomenklatura on
the other), or a clan war (between the four ma-
jor clan-and-regional-based groups), where sta-
tes aspiring to leadership in the Central Asian re-
gion played a significant role. The hot phase of
the conflict ended through peace agreements
concluded under external pressure, which were
signed in Moscow in 1997. As a result, the oppo-
sition gained limited access to power.
The Tajik conflict is the only settled military con-
flict of all those that erupted following the col-
lapse of the USSR.
2. Conflict genesis
2.1. Influence of the situations 
in other USSR regions
The conflict in Tajikistan, undoubtedly, would
not have broken out if not for the wave of natio-
nalisms, pro-independence and state-forming
movements erupting in the USSR in the late
1980s/early 1990s, clashes among the power-
holding elites and, finally, religious revival (inc-
luding the foundation of the supranational Isla-
mic Revival Party), as well as democratic and re-
actionary movements. The atmosphere at that
time also affected Tajikistan: parties and associa-
tions formed, demanding independence, cultu-
ral and national revival, construction of a Great
Tajikistan and more. These were accompanied by
manifestations that were cruelly suppressed by
authorities (1990), spontaneous riots and massa-
cres, often targeted against the minorities (in
Dushanbe the victims were usually Armenians
and Russians, and in the provinces they were Uz-
beks; the latter, along with Germans and Jews,
emigrated en masse). 
2.2. Social problems  
The country was entering independence with
a growing demographic crisis (e.g. the popula-
tion of Kulyab or Karategina grew by over 40
percent in 1979Ð1989). This, together with over-
population, problems regarding water distribu-
tion in agricultural regions and conflicts betwe-
en locals (Kulyabs) and those people forced to re-
settle in the area during the 1940sÐ1960s from
Karategina and Pamir, aroused tensions. Additio-
nally, the crisis intensified due to economic fac-
tors: production breakdown, cracking of the re-
publican, regional and general Soviet network of
economic ties and others. 
2.3. Clan clashes
In the 1980s, the first signs of a crack in the ba-
lance between the four major regional-and-clan-
based groups appeared. The arrangement exi-
sting thus far was based on the domination of
the Leninabad clan. The other clans: the Kulyabs,
Karateginians and Pamirians, had already been
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challenging that order since the mid-1980s; the
erosion of the USSR violently accelerated this
process. 
In the early 1990s, informal alliances were for-
ged between the Leninabad and Kulyab clans
(the Western clans) on one side, and the Karate-
ginian and Pamirian clans (the Eastern clans) on
the other. Combat arenas included the Supreme
Soviet in 1990Ð1992, where battles for the chair-
manÕs and other posts in the power structure to-
ok place and, in November 1991, the presidential
election, won as a result of rigging by Rakhmon
Nabiyev, who had the support of the Western
clans, his opponent being Davlat Khudonazarov
of the Badakhshan Autonomous Region (BAR).
Political clashes at the Supreme Soviet were ac-
companied by tension and manifestations in Du-
shanbe and the aggravating conflicts in the so-
uth of the country: the informal break-up of the
kolkhozes according to clan-based criteria, eco-
nomic blockades of enemy kolkhozes in the case
of food supply shortages, armed clashes, etc. 
2.4. An ideological struggle
The Eastern clans (Karateginian and Pamirian)
declared themselves to be against the ruling po-
litical system, showing in this manner their di-
sapproval of the system dominated by Lenina-
bad. In general, the intelligentsia stood up aga-
inst communism, speaking for democracy and
the cultural revival of Tajikistan. On the other
hand, Karateginians followed Islamic slogans
(the return to Islam, co-operation with Islamic
states, etc.), although no appeals for Islamisation
of the state were apparent in the beginning. 5
The four main opposition parties: the Islamic Re-
vival Party, Rastokhez, Lali Badakhshan and the
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, broke up accor-
ding to clan-based criteria. In the beginning, the
opposition enjoyed the support of democratic
groups in Russia. 
Forces referring to the ruling communist system
stood on the other side, i.e. the Leninabad and
Kulyab, who created the National Front in 1992. 
2.5. Involvement of other countries
Already in the initial phase of the conflict, the in-
volvement of third countries in Tajik internal af-
fairs was evident, and it grew with time: the We-
stern clans were supported and manipulated by
Uzbekistan and Russia, while the Eastern states
were backed by Afghanistan and Iran. 
3. The conflict (1992Ð1997)
3.1. The first phase Ð 1992 
The first, fundamental phase of the war took
place in 1992. Manifestations by the antagoni-
sing clans in Dushanbe (MarchÐApril), suppor-
ting their representatives in the seats of the re-
publicÕs authorities, marked the starting point.
These gave rise to fighting squads (the Western
clans took over most of the weapons from Soviet
warehouses, which ultimately ensured their vic-
tory). Along with the clashes in Dushanbe, fights
and slaughtering broke out in Kulyab. That sta-
ge of the war ended in December. This was
achieved by driving opposition forces out of Du-
shanbe and the escape of Karategina and Pamir
natives, who had been forced to resettle in Kuly-
ab under the USSR regime.
Simultaneously, the Western clans took over the
power in Dushanbe and in the south entirely. So-
me refugees connected with the opposition esca-
ped to Afghanistan, and opposition troops and
political authorities also found support there
(and made use of the hospitality of Iran, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia). 
3.2. The second phase 1993Ð1997 
The Karategina Valley and substantial parts of
the BAR fell out of the authoritiesÕ control. Fi-
ghts continued in the region (particularly near
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5 Tajikistan is a country strongly attached to tradition,
including to Islam, for example, in 1989 only 2.4 percent of
women were employed (in 1939 the rate was 0.7 percent,
as compared with data in neighbouring Uzbekistan, the
rates in the latter are 9.6 percent and 2.4 percent, respec-
tively). In 1990, as little as 33 percent of the republicÕs pop-
ulation lived in urban areas, and by 1997 the number
shrank to 28 percent (a substantial percentage in the first
and second generations; the main Tajik cities, Bukhara and
Samarkand were annexed in the 1920s to the Uzbek SSR). 
Tavildara and Gharm). The Tajik-Afghan border
was also a site for clashes. Apart from guerrilla
fights in the east of the country, acts of violence
in Dushanbe, numerous revolts of government
troops and fights for influence in the country be-
tween particular commanders continued con-
stantly, which clearly showed that the war was
clan-and-Mafia-based rather than of a religious
character. Circa 1994Ð1995, the Leninabad and
Kulyab coalition broke up and the latter preva-
iled (including Emomali RakhmonovÕs victory in
the presidential elections of 1995 over acandida-
te from the north). Simultaneously (in 1996), op-
position parties and groups joined together to
form the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). 
Peace agreements were signed on 27 June 1997
in Moscow as the result of strong pressure exer-
ted by Russia and Iran (though the UN and, to
a small extent, the US and Pakistan were also in-
volved in peace-bringing actions) due to the suc-
cesses of the Taliban in Afghanistan (1995Ð1997)
and the threat of defeat of Ahmed Shah Masud,
who was an ally of Iran, Russia and the UTO and,
finally, of the authorities in Dushanbe. As a re-
sult of the agreements, the UTO received 30 per-
cent of posts in the power structure, and amne-
sty and free elections were forecast. 
4. The situation in Tajikistan 
in 1997Ð2001
4.1. The internal situation and imple-
mentation of peace agreements 
The Kulyab clan controlling the stateÕs s t r a t e g i c
sectors won the war. It proved its position during
subsequent presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions. The opposition gained a number of pre s t i-
gious and profitable posts (including in the go-
vernment, administration and offices), which gu-
aranteed its loyalty in the new arrangement. Are-
as traditionally connected with the opposition Ð
the Karategina Valley and part of the BAR (where
Agha Khan IV, the leader of the Ismaili, ran his vi-
vid economic and cultural activity), are beyond
the full control of Dushanbe. Each party care f u l l y
avoided any frictions. The situation in the coun-
t ry was complicated due to the existence former
UTO troops (beyond anyoneÕs c o n t rol) and some
government commanders (gradually liquidated
by joint government and UTO forces, e.g. tro o p s
of Khudoberdiyev in Khojand, troops of Sanginov
and Mullo Abdullo from the former UTO). Assas-
sinations took place constantly against members
of the authorities. These often looked like the set-
tling of old scores between the Mafia.
Tajikistan also offered refuge to the Islamic Mo-
vement of Uzbekistan, an organisation aiming to
create an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley. In
1999 and 2000, the IMU launched attacks from
Tajikistan against Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
(the ÒBatken crisesÓ). During the anti-terrorist
operation in Afghanistan (2001Ð2002) IMU tro-
ops fought for the Taliban. 
It was the Russian forces (the 201st Mechanised
Division and border guards) that took an absolu-
te hold of the Òsuper-arbiterÓ function in Tajiki-
stan, participating in political life, as well as in-
volving themselves in illegal businesses mana-
ged in Tajikistan. 
The countryÕs social and economic situation is
still difficult: the state is unable to provide ade-
quate welfare or infrastructure; unemployment
is provisionally cured by mass migrations for se-
asonal work in Russia and Kazakhstan (approx.
700 thousand annually!). Any improvement to
this situation depends heavily on foreign aid (in-
cluding from the IMF, WB, UN and numerous
NGOs, with the Agha Khan Development Ne-
twork at the forefront). 
4.2. The Tajik conflict in the interna-
tional contex t
For Russia, the war in Tajikistan became the ba-
sis for regaining its influence in the region. By
participating, Moscow secured its patro n a g e
over the victorious camp; it used the war in or-
der to devise and elaborate methods of its ope-
ration in the Ònear abroadÓ; it used the ÒIslam
threatÓ as a bogey against other states in the re-
gion, which sought support from the Russians to
a greater or smaller extent (the implementation
of the Common Security Treaty; creation of rapid
reaction forces, bilateral agreements on military
co-operation, etc.). Russia also used the instabi-
lity in Tajikistan (including the presence of the
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IMU) to checkmate Uzbekistan, which followed
the most emancipated policy line; on top of that,
it exploited Tajikistan in order to interfere with
Afghan problems (by supplying equipment from
Tajik bases to the Northern Alliance) and, conse-
quently, to gain closer co-operation with Iran,
India and Uzbekistan, which also supported the
Northern Alliance and used Tajik transfer routes. 
Uzbekistan had, from the very beginning, tried
to develop its strong position in Tajikistan (con-
centrating on the Leninabad/Sogd region), which
the war facilitated to a g reat extent. Uzbekistan
was anxious about Tajik revisionism and funda-
mentalism spreading over its territory. Ultimate-
l y, however, a major consequence of the war is
the strengthening of Ru s s i a Õ s position in the re-
gion, which is very disadvantageous for Uzbeki-
s t a n .
Iran, despite widespread fears, did not involve it-
self substantially in the war in Tajikistan. Co-o p e-
rating with both sides and greatly contributing
to the warÕs conclusion, it emphasised consisten-
tly its endeavour to establish long-term co-o p e-
ration with Tajikistan and, in effect, stre n g t h e n
its position in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
Afghanistan: the Tajik opposition enjoyed great
support in Afghanistan: refuge was offered to
both the civil population and the opposi-
tionÕs troops. Some Afghan commanders coun-
ted on reducing the importance of Russia in the
region and exporting Islam to the post-Soviet re-
gion, later on, however, in view of the Tali-
banÕs victories, dependence on Russian aid and
pressure exerted by other patrons, the Northern
Alliance acted in favour of ending the war in Ta-
jikistan. 
5. Tajikistan following 
11 September 2001 and 
forecasts for the future
Terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September
2001, the formation of the anti-terrorist coali-
tion and the American military operation in
Afghanistan radically changed the situation
both in Tajikistan and the entire region.
The US and its allies defeated the Taliban, stop-
ping the danger of the Afghan conflict and fun-
damentalism (IMU) from spilling out into the
North. In this manner, the US played the role of
a superpower substantially shaping regional se-
curity in Central Asia. TajikistanÕs participation
in the coalition (providing access to bases, etc.)
opened the country to political, military and
economic contacts with the world (especially
the West) on a scale that had, thus far, been uni-
maginable. 
Notwithstanding such essential changes, Tajiki-
stanÕs most important partner is still Russia,
which holds the strongest instruments for cre-
ating a situation. This mainly concerns security
issues, firstly in connection with political ties
(bilateral agreements, participation in the Com-
mon Security Treaty Organisation and the Shan-
ghai Co-operation Organisation), secondly due
to increasing military presence (reinforcing of
the 201st Mechanised Division and granting it
the status of a permanent base).
It should be noted that 11 September 2001 coin-
cided with the settling down of Tajik internal
conflicts: a substantial part of the UTO found
their feet in the new power arrangement and jo-
ined in the process of its consolidation; the pu-
blic is obviously tired of the war and its conse-
quences. Simultaneously, one could get the im-
pression that regional elites emerged from the
war much more mature, and some ways of thin-
king in terms of the state, raison dÕtat, etc. can
be noted. If the situation develops in a positive
fashion, Tajikistan should steadily be reconstruc-
ted and normalised, although this will be an ar-
duous and difficult process.
An extensive and difficult to overcome set of
problems are the social effects of the war: emi-
gration of almost the entire intelligentsia (inclu-
ding Russians and other minorities), the collapse
of education, healthcare, crime and corruption. 
Presently, the best conditions for troublemaking
(that have nothing to do with the civil war) exist
in the Fergana Valley, which is divided between
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Social,
ecological (water management) and political
problems (marginalisation of the Fergana clans)
and cultural background (strong Islamic tradi-
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tions) render the region susceptible to the erup-
tion of social and political conflicts. One of the
major mouthpieces of dissatisfaction is the Isla-
mic fundamentalist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Krzysztof Strachota
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